

# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California



## THESIS

### FACTORS AFFECTING NEGOTIATOR ORIENTATION

by

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December 1997

Principal Advisor:

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## FACTORS AFFECTING NEGOTIATOR ORIENTATION

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
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
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


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
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## ABSTRACT

Selected negotiation process models are presented through this conceptual work, which proposes to detect and identify those behaviors, processes, and structures affecting the dynamics of the negotiation process. The factors identified in this work have been drawn primarily from similar studies examining the forces which promote either competitive or cooperative orientations in negotiators. This study reports the results of an extensive survey of the literature and interviews of experts in deciding which of these factors also engender position-based and interest-based orientations in negotiators. The researcher proposes an original model which shows that in this dynamic: (1) a specific pattern of cyclical transactions characterizes the negotiator's orientation, and (2) the parties to a conflict can be seen as shifting between a position-based orientation and an interest-based orientation as certain conditions emerge. Additionally, the researcher's model suggests that negotiation can be defined as a cyclical process of transactional exchanges among a set of parties seeking to fulfill their sets of needs through social influence. Studies in management, psychology, organizational behavior, conflict resolution, and systems dynamics provide the theoretical underpinnings of the model.



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## I. INTRODUCTION

### A. PURPOSE AND DIRECTION

From contracting to psychology, from marketing to law, theories on negotiation and conflict resolution have emerged out of a myriad of disciplines. Contributions from these fields make up much of the largely disjointed body of literature on negotiation. The major thrust of the literature has been to develop effective strategies and tactics in negotiation. While "pop psychology" and popular business works on the tactics and strategies of negotiation abound, these writings remain distinctly separate from scholarly work. One noted exception is Roger Fisher's (1991) *Getting to Yes*, which is both popular and a solid primer for serious study in negotiation. Another way in which *Getting to Yes* stands apart from its popular counterparts is in its advocacy of interest-based negotiations. This is a departure from the trend of popular books which tend to advocate position-based tactics and strategies. The intent of this work is to prepare a framework for existing theories and further studies of interest-based negotiation. Specifically, the purpose of this work is to detect and identify those behaviors, processes, and structures which affect the negotiators' tactical orientation: interest-based or position-based.

### B. SPECIFIC PROBLEM

In negotiations, the parties to a conflict can be seen as shifting between a competitive orientation and a cooperative orientation in an effort to arrive at the best approach. The parties' choice of orientation helps determine both how effectively they will negotiate and the likelihood that they will achieve their desired outcomes. This research focuses on the motivation behind the shift in negotiator orientation<sup>1</sup> from position-based to interest-based negotiation. Volumes


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<sup>1</sup> "Negotiator orientation" generally refers to the negotiator's inclination towards either a competitive or cooperative approach. In this study, "negotiator orientation" may also indicate the inclinations to use either interest-based or position-based negotiation.

of works on negotiation examine competitive negotiations, cooperative negotiations, or both, but the needs of this study require this distinction: competitive sessions are clearly position-based, but cooperative sessions can play out as either position-based or interest based negotiations. To further illustrate this distinction, the researcher offers a model (Figure 1). While depicting the cyclical nature of negotiation, this model underscores the incongruity of the two approaches. In the distributive cycle, the negotiators focus on positions and react to their counter-parts' choices. In the integrative cycle, the negotiators focus on interests and dove-tail their ideas to achieve a mutual agreement. Research in this area has implications for a contingency-based concept for effective behaviors and psychological approaches in negotiation.

### **C. OBJECTIVE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

The researcher has proposed the above model to illustrate a particular conflict dynamic: where negotiators focus their attention in the negotiation process *in general*, and how that focus determines the steps they take in negotiations. Position-based negotiators focus on their counterpart(s) responses to their actions, and any change in their counterpart's position. That focus forces the parties to take the steps in Boyd's Cycle: observation, orientation, decision, action. Interest-based negotiators focus on the alternatives and options available. That focus forces the parties to take steps in the dialectic cycle: thesis, antithesis, synthesis. From this model, we can infer a fundamental axiom about the negotiation process: *negotiation can be seen as a cyclical process of transactional exchange among parties seeking to fulfill their sets of needs through social influence*. The model suggests a pathway by which a set of "cross over" factors has the potential to make any real negotiation vacillate between distributive and integrative processes. More to the point, the parties can transition from their concern for their own respective positions to their concern for the underlying interests involved, or vice-versa. The proposed model serves uniquely as a



**Figure 1. Cyclical Model of Transactional Exchange  
(proposed by the researcher)**

process-concern for their own respective positions to their concern for the underlying interests involved, or vice-versa. The proposed model serves uniquely as a process-focus model, since it highlights the differences between the focus of a position-based negotiation and the focus of an interest-based negotiation. Other models, such as Thomas' (1976) conflict resolution model, do a better job of outlining the generic phases of an episode in a negotiation; however, the proposed model melds the process to the differing approaches—interests versus positions. The proposed model implies that our actions not only affect the size of the pie or the size of the slice, but the choice the other person makes—whether to “grow the pie” or opt for a larger share of the existing pie. Our understanding of the factors affecting negotiator orientation allows us to plan and employ more effective behaviors in negotiation. In other words, we can make sure that our behavior elicits the most favorable response from our counter-part. We can make sure that our counter-parts cooperate if we want them to cooperate; compete, if we want them to compete. We may be better able to ensure that they focus on positions or interests as we see fit. Negotiators who understand the dynamics of these “cross-over”<sup>2</sup> factors—the antecedents, the specific behaviors, and the effects—can use leadership to optimize their outcomes in a negotiation. The focus of the proposed thesis is these cross-over factors.

### **1. Primary Research Question**

To what extent do cross-over factors between distributive and integrative negotiation processes exist and how might such factors affect negotiator orientation?

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<sup>2</sup> The researcher has applied the phrase “cross-over” factors after receiving feedback from Robert Barrios-Choplin, Ph.D., of the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. Professor Barrios-Choplin attributes this phrase, “cross-over” factors, to the concepts outlined in Doc Lew Childre's Cut Thru, Boulder Creek, Calif: Planetary Publications, date unknown.

## **2.     Subsidiary Research Questions**

- a.     What are distributive and integrative negotiations?
- b.     Do negotiations vacillate between the distributive and integrative cycles of the model?
- c.     Does a set of common cross-over factors exist?
- d.     What are the antecedents to these cross-over factors?
- e.     How might knowledge of these factors assist in understanding negotiator orientation?

## **3.     Rationale for Pursuing the Question**

The behavioral underpinnings of negotiation are perhaps the least developed area of negotiation research. Furthermore, negotiation theory is relatively disjointed, addressing a broad array of practical venues for negotiators, such as legal, national security, labor, etc. It does not address the processes which these venues have in common. Furthermore, much of the relevant theoretical work has been developed by the academic research of game theorists and conflict management theorists. The researcher proposes to identify factors affecting negotiator orientation and behavior. Research in this area could offer valuable practical information for negotiators wanting to know the most effective behaviors and psychological approaches to support their strategic aims in negotiations. In other words, when negotiators understand whether the identified factors will foster either the position-based or the interest-based approach from their counterpart, they can employ the most effective tactical *and strategic* behaviors in negotiations.

## **D.     SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS**

The main intent of this study is to identify the factors affecting negotiator orientation. As such, the review of the literature encompasses research in management, marketing, conflict resolution and gaming, organizational behavior, and social psychology. Collectively, these disciplines applied a plethora of behavioral concepts and yielded the prospective list of factors, *the "cross-over"*

*factors*, which are offered to foster insight into the primary research question. The sparse academic research on interest-based negotiation placed a major limitation on this study. Most of the published research addresses cooperative negotiation, not interest-based negotiation. To finally derive the cross-over factors, results were gleaned from the body of research predicting a cross-over between competitive and cooperative approaches, not position- and interest-based.

Typically, the next step in research of this type would be to validate, or challenge, the findings presented in the literature review in an experiment; however, an examination of each of the several cross-over factors may have required as many as 27 experiments. The field studies or field observations methodology is commonly used in this type of research and would have offered an ideal approach to the problem of examining the many cross-over factors in the natural setting of a negotiation. Unfortunately, the lack of opportunities to observe true interest-based negotiations made this approach impractical. To further identify and analyze the cross-over factors required the more qualitative research techniques. To answer the position- to interest-based question, the researcher simply asked the "experts." Specifically, the researcher asked experts from various related fields to validate a set of statements regarding the cross-over factors. In other words, the survey of the literature offered several specific results on cooperative negotiations in certain settings which may or may not be generalizable to interest-based negotiations as a whole. The expert interviews offered a means of achieving consensus from people who may have had the opportunity to do the type of field studies and field observations that this researcher could not. This approach to creating a list of cross-over factors relies heavily on one basic assumption: "that knowledge about human behavior can be gained by the traditional method of interlacing theoretical deductions with controlled observations." (Rapoport, p. v.)

This survey of literature on negotiations, synthesis of relevant behavioral concepts, and analysis of specific factors affecting negotiator orientation are within the scope of this thesis. The generalizations made in this study stem from specific findings which may or may not apply when conditions differ from the original experiment. The underlying assumption about the negotiation process was stated as an axiom in section C above: negotiation can be seen as a cyclical process of transactional exchange among parties seeking to fulfill their sets of needs through social influence.

## **E. ORGANIZATION**

Chapter I presents the purpose and direction of the study, addresses the specific problem of the research, and outlines the objective of this work. This introductory chapter further lists the research questions, presents the rationale for pursuing these questions, and establishes the scope, limitation, and assumptions of the work. Chapter I also presents the researcher's model, which is a construct illustrating the relationships between negotiator orientation and specific patterns of transactional exchanges. In order to discuss the principal terms in the context of the various theories and disciplines, the principal terms are defined in Chapter II.

Chapter II addresses the research question: What are distributive and integrative negotiations? It presents the definitions of principal terms and the history and systems of theories which this thesis relates to the negotiation process; in other words, Chapter II establishes the pedigree of ideas. This chapter outlines key theories in competitive gaming and mixed motive (cooperative versus competitive) theory, and interest-based negotiation. It presents the cyclical components of the researcher's model: Boyd's Cycle and the dialectic cycle.

Chapter III addresses the research question: do negotiations vacillate between the distributive and integrative cycles of the model? This chapter provides an explanation and analysis of several process models which suggest

mechanisms through which negotiators change their orientation. Additionally, this chapter places March and Simon's taxonomy of the Organizational Reactions to Conflict along a continuum, which represents the third component of the researcher's proposed model.

Chapter IV addresses the research question: does a set of common cross-over factors exist? It outlines a set of factors thought to affect negotiator orientation. These cross-over factors were drawn primarily from "A Framework for Understanding the Choice of Conflict Resolution Methods" (Dant & Schul, 1992), "Negotiation Strategies: Different Strokes for Different Folks" (Johnston, 1982), relevant research findings, and key factors drawn from the models presented in Chapter III.

Chapter V addresses the research question: what are the antecedents of the cross-over factors? This chapter considers certain incentive systems and "Eight Personality Characteristics" (Hermann & Kogan, 1977) to examine the antecedents of the cross-over factors.

Chapter VI addresses the research question: how might knowledge of these factors assist in understanding negotiator orientation? This chapter presents several concepts from social psychology, cognitive psychology, game theory, and systems theory as they relate to the models presented in Chapter III.

Chapter VII presents the conclusions and recommendations. This chapter considers the implications for the researcher's model. It makes recommendations concerning professional training and organizational systems that are designed to influence negotiator orientation. Finally, Chapter VII summarizes the answers to the primary and secondary research questions and offers suggestions for further research.

## II. SURVEY OF SYSTEMS OF NEGOTIATION

### A. INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

#### 1. A Framework for the Scope and Methodology


This chapter outlines selected theories and models which present a set of emergent patterns relating to negotiator orientation. In the language of systems theory, this chapter presents key process maps, flow charts, and other illustrations of theoretical constructs used to represent the complex arrangements and relationships involved in negotiations. (Checkland, 1981) The holism of systems thinking is better able than the reductionism<sup>1</sup> of the scientific method to provide a useful framework in which to examine the continuous salvo of transactions conducted at the negotiations table. The systems approach examines interrelations by constructing models which embody various degrees of complexity. The scientific approach typically involves experimentation to determine cause and effect relationships by controlling variables. This approach is limited in its ability to explain, predict, or control the complex set of psychological factors inherent in negotiations. On the other hand, the scientific approach *can* produce empirical evidence that these systems models are indeed useful. This study draws from research using both approaches; however, the systems approach predominates as the foundation for the framework of this chapter.

The negotiation process plays itself out as a pattern of cyclical exchanges contained within a systematic arrangement of events. The Sawyer-Guetzkow

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<sup>1</sup> Reductionism affirms the view that a researcher can (and should) examine a problem by studying its component parts and drawing conclusions about the whole from these findings. It is one of three characteristics of the scientific method, the other two are repeatability, and refutation. "We may *reduce* the complexity of the variety of the real world in experiments whose results are validated by their *repeatability*, and we may build knowledge by the *refutation* of hypothesis." (Checkland, 1981, p. 51) Checkland goes further to contrast the reductionism of the traditional scientific methodology with the holism of systems thinking. Relevant to this research is the ability of the holistic approach of systems thinking to detect and explain emerging patterns not apparent when we reduce complex systems to their component parts.

negotiation model (see Figure 2) outlines and maps these events in negotiations. Arising out of a decision model depicting the phases of international conflict resolution, the Sawyer-Guetzkow model characterizes negotiation as a series of activities that precede, parallel, and follow bargaining-at-the-table. (Karass, 1968, pp. 21-22) Described within the framework of the Sawyer-Guetzkow model, this study focuses on factors which cause negotiators to change their respective orientations from position-based to interest-based and vice versa—factors which emerge primarily as the background factors of the model.



**Figure 2. Stages of Negotiation (Sawyer-Guetzkow, 1958)**

## **2. The Framework for the Primary Research Question**

The researcher's model in Figure 1 depicts the cross-over dynamic as a continuum of organizational approaches to handling conflict. The model suggests that the cyclical patterns of transactional exchanges are different on either end of the continuum. It further suggests that a set of cross-over factors can foster a change in the organization's approach to handling conflict. The cross-over factors are conditions which affect the process of bargaining "at the table" by bringing about a shift from position-based negotiation to interest-based negotiation, or vice versa. As we will read later in this chapter, several experiments have shown that factors exist to engender a related cross-over: the shift between competitive and cooperative negotiation. While these experiments generally follow *reductionism's* approach to creating knowledge, they *do* enhance this study by introducing empirical evidence that certain factors can engender the cross-over in negotiator orientation which is central to the research question. Since the researcher's model sets up the framework for the existence of cross-over factors, this chapter compares the components of this model to other well established theories and models. The next section of this chapter first addresses the notion that negotiations follow a cyclical pattern of transactional exchanges, and then offer a model which outlines the various orientations.

### **B. CYCLICAL PATTERNS CHARACTERIZING NEGOTIATOR ORIENTATION**


#### **1. Thomas' Model of Dyadic Conflict Episodes**

In Kenneth Thomas's (1990) Model of Dyadic Conflict Episodes, he illustrated the basic component of the negotiation process as a pattern of sub-processes having both linear and cyclical properties. These sub-processes (episodes) and their components are shown in Figure 3. The episodes of a negotiation are comprised of six basic phases: *awareness, thoughts and emotions, intentions, behavior, other's reaction, and outcomes*. (Thomas, 1990, pp. 664-667)

*Awareness* emerges when one party perceives that another party can, to some degree, control the one's ability to attain a goal. In Thomas's words, "Conflicts appear to stem from one party's perception that another party frustrates the satisfaction of one of its concerns." (Thomas, 1976, pp. 900) Following awareness, the party's *thoughts and emotions* generate both normative (or value) and rational (or payoff) judgments. In other words, thoughts and emotions emerge which cause the parties to consider how they feel about the other party and about specific aspects of the agreement. As thoughts and emotions arise, the parties will make some estimate of the benefit of a potential payoff. Here, the normative and rational judgments may be in conflict. For example, a person might make the rational judgment that "\$37,000 is the best price I've been offered to buy this Jeep Cherokee." However, this person's emotional, normative judgment might suggest that "no one should pay more than \$35,000 for a car." In this case, the normative and rational judgments present an internal conflict for the party involved. The party then forms *intentions* regarding the issue, considers options, looks for opportunities to bargain, and accepts some pattern of conflict of interest—all or none, zero-sum game, win-win, unresolvable—which best fits his or her awareness or conceptualization. (Thomas, 1976) The party then *behaves* according to his or her intentions. This Behavior represents the fundamental activity in negotiation.<sup>2</sup> *Other's reaction* represents the counterpart's behavior in a negotiation. As the Thomas model shows, negotiation becomes a cyclical process as the parties begin to exert mutual influence on the other's behavior and on their conceptualizations of the issues at stake.

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<sup>2</sup> In Thomas's (1976) earlier publication, he represented the behavioral event as having three components: orientation, strategic objectives, and tactical behavior. These components of behavior mirror three of the four components of the competitive cycle (Figure 5 in next subsection): *orientation* matches *orientation*, *strategic objectives* matches *decision*, and *tactical behavior* matches *action*. Thomas's behavioral event presents a sound opportunity to compare Thomas's Model of Dyadic Conflict Episodes to Boyd's competitive cycle.



**Figure 3. Process Model of Conflict Episodes (Thomas, 1990)**

Thomas also discusses the parties' propensity to increase or decrease the level of assertiveness, aggression, and even hostility.<sup>3</sup> The other's reaction provides key feedback to the cognitive processes involved in deciding how to interact. Other's reaction constitutes the feedback loop in a cyclical process of continuous behavioral interaction until some agreement is reached. The final event, *outcome*, represents the parties' coming to some resolution. The parties may resolve to make some formal agreement, a tacit agreement, or no agreement at all.

Thomas' model supports the idea that negotiation can be seen as a cyclical process of transactional exchanges among parties seeking to fulfill their sets of needs through social influence. Beyond the Thomas model, negotiations can also be described as having competitive/distributive (Carver, 1995, Tip. 7) qualities or cooperative/integrative (Carver, 1995, Tip. 9) qualities. The characteristics of the transactional exchanges vary according to the mix of negotiators or the phase of negotiations. In either case—negotiator type or negotiation phase—the transactional exchanges among parties follows a cyclical process of interaction. While the Thomas model depicts conflict management as a linear process made of episodes, the researcher's model explains negotiation as a cyclical process of transactional exchanges based on Boyd's Cycle and the Dialectic Cycle. This approach emphasizes the different nature of competitive and cooperative, or interest-based versus position-based interactions. The next two subsections compare the negotiation process to these cycles, respectively.

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<sup>3</sup> The topic of aggression is developed more fully in Chapter III, Section G, Subsection 2 in the context of Thomas and Kilmann's Model of Five Conflict Handling Modes. Since Thomas and Kilmann present a dual concern model which suggests that negotiators can exhibit high assertiveness together with high cooperation, the topic of assertiveness is further addressed as an optimum level of force on a continuum. This continuum includes forms of aggression and passiveness.

## 2. The Patterns of Conflict and Competitive Transactions

In competitive exchanges, the negotiation follows a pattern similar to all competition. Through his pioneering thesis, "The Nature of Conflict"<sup>4</sup>, Colonel John Boyd, USAF (Ret.), articulated the dynamics of the archetypal pattern of conflict. From his experience as a combat pilot in Korea, he recognized the cyclical nature of actions and responses in aerial combat and developed his operations research treatise. (Lind, 1985, pp. 4-5) As a generalized theory on conflict<sup>5</sup>, his work applies in business, economics, and other non-military applications including negotiations. Lind cites the crux of the theory behind Boyd's cycle as follows:

Conflict can be seen as a series of time-competitive observation-orientation-decision-action cycles. Each party to a conflict [negotiation] begins by observing. He observes himself, his physical surroundings and his enemy. On the basis of his observation, he orients, that is to say, he makes a mental image or "snapshot" of his situation. On the basis of this orientation, he makes a decision. He puts the decision into effect, i.e., he acts. Then because he assumes his action has changed the situation, he observes again..." (Lind, 1985, p. 5)


We can illustrate the dynamics of the competitive/distributive processes of negotiations by using Boyd's Cycle or the Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action (OODA) loop (see Figure 4). The parties to a negotiation observe the behaviors of their counterparts, specifically focusing on verbal and non-verbal communications. The negotiators then orient or evaluate these communications

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<sup>4</sup> "The Nature of Conflict" is the title of the five hour oral treatise which Col. Boyd delivered over a period of years to explain the theory of maneuver warfare.

<sup>5</sup> In 1993, the author first recognized the similarity of competition in negotiation and warfare and used Boyd's cycle to illustrate this point. Similarly, Hearn (1996, pp. 202-3) developed a framework for competitive negotiation from the nine "Principles of War." Participants who act competitively in a negotiation can be seen as working through this conflict cycle which contains elements similar to those of the Thomas model illustrated above. Theorists disagree over the distinctions to be made between competition and conflict, but this debate is beyond the scope of this paper.

against various mental models or ways of understanding the world. Based on the negotiators' mental models, they then decide what the observed behavior or communication meant. They decide what issues to address—respective goals, the negotiation process, prospective outcomes, conditions, or rules of the game. They decide on the manner of addressing specific issues: to accept or to contest. Based on their experience, the negotiators take some action in hopes of bringing about a desired effect. The negotiators again observe and again repeat the cycle, thereby executing a series of exchanges to fit some tactical purpose; thereby executing a set of tactical schemes to carry out some overall strategy. As this discussion of Boyd's cycle has shown, relevant theories sprang forth from various quarters. The development of the game theorists' school of thought brought out a framework by which we can view negotiator orientation as cooperative or competitive.



**Figure 4. Boyd's Cycle (The OODA Loop) (Lind, 1985)**

The question of negotiator orientation was first framed by game theory which examined the choice of strategies in mixed mode games: games in which the participants could chose either to compete or to cooperate. The game theorists had discovered that strategists (or negotiators) often faced a dilemma as they worked to maximize their payoffs. In a certain set of problems, the participants chose to compete by selecting their dominant strategy, the strategy which yields the best outcome regardless of the opponent's choice. However, in the mixed mode problem, participants typically found that by competing and selecting their dominant strategy, they secured a lower payoff than they would have by cooperating. This problem gave rise to many studies in mixed mode strategies. Mixed motive games provided the framework for many researcher experiments. Some of the more prevalent of these "Collective Action Dilemma Problems" (Goetz, 1994, p. 60) are the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Commons Dilemma, the Public Goods Provision Games, and "Chicken."

In the classic prisoner's dilemma, two participants, Prisoner A and Prisoner B, are given two options or strategies. (Rapoport and Chammah, 1965; Dixit and Nalebuff, 1991) (see Figure 5 below) Strategy one is do not confess; strategy two is confess. For any combination of strategies, each prisoner's payoff is shown below in the matrix. Prisoner A receives the value on the left of the virgule (/), Prisoner B, the value on the right. So for example, if Prisoner A confesses and Prisoner B does not, then A gets a one year sentence and B gets 25 years.

		<i>Prisoner A</i>	
		Do not confess	Confess
<i>Prisoner B</i>	Do not confess	3/3	1/25
	Confess	25/1	10/10

**Figure 5. The Prisoner's Dilemma**

In another similar example, suppose a couple is negotiating a divorce settlement. Instead of "do not confess," let option one be "do not retain counsel"; option two, "retain counsel." Let the pay off matrix represent the amount of debt each couple carries after the divorce. As most divorcing couples discover, the prisoner's dilemma has real implications: the vast majority of couples elect the pareto inefficient Nash solution and retain attorneys. The prisoner's dilemma and similarly designed mixed mode games provided the framework for decades of empirical research into the question of what factors engender either the competitive or cooperative orientation. The primary assumption for most game theorists is that the participants will compete rationally to maximize their payoffs. Given that a certain payoff matrix does not reward cooperation, the game theorists' rational view would always prescribe competition for that particular game. From this view, cooperation for cooperation's sake was seen as a "soft" and generally less effective approach. What confounded many researchers of mixed mode game problems was the fact that human beings often fail to pursue the so-called rational course. The other short-coming of the game theorists' school of thought is that it engendered an either/or view of negotiation: either cooperate or compete. Despite this fallacy of bifurcation, the game theorists established a somewhat useful framework in which to examine negotiator orientation. Many publications use this framework or some modification as their point of departure. For example, as his title suggests, Robert W. Johnston (1982) presents a modified framework in his "Three Modes of Negotiating Behavior and Their Predicted Results: Competitive, Collaborative, and Subordinative." Johnston's model draws a unique distinction between two types of cooperative orientations: collaborative and subordinative. In the collaborative orientation, both parties act cooperatively *yet assertively*, that is to say, they act to achieve the desires of both parties. In the subordinative orientation, one party acts cooperatively and unassertively.


Subordinative negotiators respond to the other parties' needs at the expense of their own.

Deutsch (1949, 1973, 1980) proposed a useful way to distinguish cooperative and competitive contexts. In cooperation, people believe that their goals are positively related; one's goal attainment helps others reach their goals. In competition, they believe that their goals are negatively related; they can achieve their goals only to the extent that others fail to achieve theirs. In independence, goals are unrelated; one's goal accomplishment neither facilitates nor frustrates other's goals. Deutsch theorized that how people believe their goals are related greatly affects the dynamics and outcomes of interaction. These goal interdependencies are pure types, and perhaps most often situations have a mix of linked goals. (Lindskold, Betz & Walters, 1986, p. 100) This "mix of linked (but often undisclosed) goals" presents the fundamental challenge for the negotiator who attempts to game the process without considering the underlying psychological issues: needs and motivation. Even if disclosed, certain underlying motives often go ignored as seemingly trivial matters by one party, while these motives hold primary importance to the other. So often this is the reason behind the apparently irrational behavior of our counterparts.


### **3. The Patterns of Integrative Transactions**

In integrative exchanges, the negotiation follows a pattern similar to the dialectic cycle—thesis, antithesis, and synthesis (see Figure 6). Like the competitive or distributive process, the integrative process contains clearly definable cognitive phases, i.e., phases which distinctly outline the negotiator's mental focus. Thesis represents the negotiator's interests; antithesis represents the negotiator's understanding of the other party's interest. The integrative action begins with the work of clearly identifying the set of substantive interests that each party brings to the table. (Fisher, 1991, p. 11) Negotiators then work to dovetail or

integrate their privately held interests into a set of mutual interests. Roger Fisher of the Harvard Negotiation Project has outlined, analyzed, and prescribed the integrative approach to negotiations in several publications. In *Getting to Yes*, the first of his popularly marketed series, Fisher (1991, p. 68) developed a model (see Figure 7) which details four basic steps in inventing options: problem, analysis, approach, and action ideas. In the first of these steps toward inventing options or achieving synthesis, the negotiators view the problem as what's wrong in the real world. In the second step, analysis, they consider what's wrong in theory. In the third step, they devise an approach based on their analysis; they ask what might be done in theory. Finally, in the fourth step, action ideas represent what might be done in the real world. While Fisher's four step model provides better descriptive details for the integrative process, the dialectic cycle provides a more suitable archetype for the transactional exchanges between interest-based negotiators.



**Figure 6. Dialectic Cycle (The Integrative Process)**



**Figure 7. Four Basic Steps in Invention Options (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991)**

This interest-based school of thought has emerged as a result of decades of research and publications from the Harvard Negotiation Project. The concept of interest-based negotiation, sometimes referred to as “Win-Win” or principled negotiation, represents a departure from the game theorists’ view. Where the game theory paradigm established negotiator orientation as competitive versus cooperative, the Harvard paradigm offers a new dichotomy: position-based versus interest-based. Interest-based negotiation is an approach to bargaining which focuses on the basic need or underlying concern that is addressed by a proposal. In contrast, position-based negotiation focuses on a “position, proposal, or chosen solution to a particular problem, or goal.” (Collective Bargaining Reporter, Fall

1995) Interest-based negotiation requires its participants to produce “alternative solutions to the problem as a means of putting together the most attractive package for all concerned.” (Williams, 1983, p. 70) The four part method which Roger Fisher (1991) prescribed in *Getting to Yes* entails (a) “separating the people from the problem,” (b) “focusing on interests, not positions,” (c) “inventing options for mutual gain,” and (d) “insisting on using objective criteria.” Interest-based negotiation can be further defined as problem-solving dialogue<sup>6</sup> where parties cooperate by pooling efforts to uncover information, develop alternatives independent of the degree to which outcomes serve self-interests, then agree on an alternative which is best for each party and for the relationship as a whole. The interest-based approach is characteristically cooperative, but also distinguished by aspects which are not essential to a cooperative negotiation. (see Figure 8 below)

Focuses on underlying issues
Examines set of needs directly (position-based seeks need fulfillment by achieving certain desired positions)
Exhibits mutual problem-solving behavior
Does not advocate positions/outcomes to serve self-interest in early stages
Stresses seeking, assembling, and sharing of information
Places emphasis on developing new alternatives/use of dialogue
Acts assertive in selecting favorable alternative; good for self & relationship
Proceeds independent of trust

**Figure 8: Distinguishing Characteristics of Interest-based Negotiation  
(Proposed by the researcher)**

<sup>6</sup> It is important to draw this fundamental distinction between dialogue and conventional discussion. Having the same roots as the words ‘concussion’ and ‘percussion,’ *discussion* connotes the process of beating, i.e., beating an idea into someone else’s head. Dialogue, on the other hand, stems from the Greek words *dia* for ‘through’ and *logos* for ‘words.’ Dialogue is a synergistic activity through which the exchange of ideas yields knowledge not previously held by constituents. For a better understanding of the value of dialogue, read Senge (1990, pp. 238-49). “The purpose of a dialogue is to go beyond any one individual’s understanding” (Senge, 241)

Interest-based negotiation is often confused with cooperative negotiation. Some writers characterize both approaches as “soft” and vulnerable to the tactics of the competitive negotiator who feigns cooperation. The best safeguard for the interest-based negotiator is to follow Fisher’s (1988) guidelines of Unconditionally Constructive Behavior (Figure 9 below) and to develop a Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) before every negotiation. (Fisher, 1991, pp. 97-106) The BATNA is the negotiator’s “walk-away” alternative, i.e., it represents what the negotiator will do if he or she cannot achieve a better bargain at the table. Before entering into a negotiation, it is prudent to improve the BATNA to the extent possible.

<b>Unconditionally constructive advice:</b>	<b>Good for the relationship because:</b>	<b>Good for me because:</b>
1. Balance emotion with reason.	An irrational battle is less likely.	I make fewer mistakes.
2. Try to understand.	The better I understand you, the fewer collisions we will have.	The less I shoot in the dark, the better solutions I can invent and the better able I am to influence you.
3. Inquire, consult, and listen	We both participate in making decisions. Better communication improves them.	I reduce the risk of making a mistake without giving up the ability to decide.
4. Be reliable.	It tends to build trust and confidence.	My words will have more impact.
5. Be open to persuasion; try to persuade	If people are persuaded rather than coerced, both the outcome and compliance are better.	By being open, I keep learning; it is easier to resist coercion if one is open to persuasion.
6. Accept the other as worth dealing with and learning from.	To deal well with our differences, I have to deal with you and have an open mind.	By dealing with you and reality, I remove obstacles to learning the facts and to persuading you on the merits.

**Figure 9. Unconditionally Constructive Behavior  
(Fisher & Brown, 1989)**


In theory, where competition often yields the pareto inefficient Nash solution, the interest-based approach finds the pareto efficient solution. (Dixit and Nalebuff, 1991) It achieves this pareto efficient solution by communicating underlying interests, seeking to dove-tail these interests, and working together to solve the jointly-owned problem. For example, suppose a newly hired pre-school teacher has re-entered the workforce. She begins to negotiate the terms of her employment from this *position*: she demands a wage of \$7.50 an hour and free admission for her pre-school aged child. The pre-school administrator takes a different *position*: she offers \$7.50 and no free admission. After some discussion, the newly hired teacher airs her concern for cutting her overall costs. The new job requires a new wardrobe and more meals away from home; it brings increased tax liability and child care costs, etc. She adds that her husband's recent raise moves the family into a much higher tax bracket. Coupled with her new tax liability and new expenses, her new teaching position becomes a money-losing proposition. The administrator now discusses some of the tax implications which the couple might have overlooked. Considering the large tax deduction the couple will receive for day care expenses, the teacher and the administrator realize an opportunity for a pareto efficient solution. The Preschool gets its tuition, and the teacher gets her "free day care," courtesy of the U.S. Government tax refund.

Interest-based negotiation underscores the importance of long-term relationships. As Fisher (1991) states when prescribing "Win-Win or no deal," we either look out for both parties, or we refuse to deal. To do otherwise is to undermine the long-term relationship and establish an adversarial future; to do otherwise is to force the participants towards the pareto inefficient Nash solutions at which competitors fight to maximize their payoffs. The following subsection draws further distinctions between competitive and position-based negotiations and between cooperative and interest-based negotiations.

### C. ORIENTATION AND POSITIONING

According to Williams (1983), at the outset of negotiations, negotiators adopt an orientation which supports one of three positional modes: a maximalist position, equitable position, and integrative position. The maximalist position is characteristically competitive and position-based. This position assumes a zero sum game. From the maximalist position, participants assume that they maximize their payoffs by making extreme initial demands. The equitable position is characteristically position-based, yet cooperative. The central concerns here are equity and fairness through compromise. From the equitable position, participants assume that they can best respond to one another's needs by making equal concessions on their positional demands and accepting lower payoffs. The integrative position is characteristically cooperative and interest-based. In contrast to the equitable position, the integrative position or approach is a problem-solving approach. Driven by its interest-based aspects, it seeks to resolve the underlying problems in order to achieve the pareto efficient solution. In Figure 10 below, the researcher offers a Venn diagram to draw distinctions between competitive and position-based, cooperative and interest-based. Thus the value of Williams' taxonomy in this discussion is its usefulness as a framework to compare and contrast the two orientations presented, namely the competitive versus cooperative orientations, and position- versus interest-based orientations. Again, the position-based sphere overlaps the cooperative sphere because some negotiations (the equitable position) can be characterized as both position-based and cooperative. That part of the position-based sphere outside of the cooperative sphere represents the most competitive region (the maximalist position), where cooperation is low and differences in positions are seen as fixed. Conversely, that part of the cooperative sphere outside of the position-based sphere represents the most integrative region (the integrative position), where cooperation is high and

differences are not seen as fixed to positions. This representation of interest-based and position-based against the researcher's model based on William's taxonomy helps show that negotiations can take on hybrid forms. Negotiations are not either/or propositions; interest-based or position-based. Rather, negotiations are characterized by certain qualities which can be shown along a continuum generally reflecting purely position-based approaches on one end versus purely interest-based approaches on the other.



**Figure 10. Model of Three Positions as Regions of Negotiator Orientation  
(Proposed by Researcher)**

#### **D. SUMMARY**

Integrative or interest-based negotiation is a distinct subset of cooperative negotiation. It involves a high degree of informational exchange aimed at mutual problem-solving. It is characterized by interactions which facilitate relatively higher levels of trust than would be found in other negotiations. Trust is not a requirement of integrative negotiations; however, those actions typical in integrative negotiations generally promote trust. Cooperative negotiations entail a broad set of negotiations where parties accommodate their counterparts' efforts to explore their own needs. In cooperative negotiations, the parties are more open to persuasion. In distributive or position-based negotiations, parties typically focus on some plan of action or objective to fulfill their sets of needs. The effort to secure some agreement focuses on these objectives, or positions, and not on the parties' overall concerns or interests. Again, in position-based negotiations, parties can work either cooperatively or competitively. Cooperative position-based negotiators typically view differences as fixed, focus on securing objectives to meet end goals, allow for their counterparts' efforts to pursue their own objectives, and expect that fair agreements can be achieved through compromise. Just as the more cooperative negotiators might, competitive position-based negotiators typically view differences as fixed and focus on securing objectives to meet end goals. However, competitive position-based negotiators see the agreement as the conclusion of some zero sum contest and focus on maximizing the gains from their own objectives.

Chapter III presents a series of models which suggest that negotiations can shift between position- and interest-based approaches, or more accurately, vacillate in some real sense between the two pure ideals represented on an interest-based/position-based continuum. The researcher's model places the taxonomy offered by March and Simon (1958) along such a continuum.



### III. MODELS REPRESENTING THE DYNAMICS IN NEGOTIATOR ORIENTATION

The theories and models presented in this chapter outline and illustrate certain dynamics relating to negotiator orientation. Several theories specifically address the competitive to cooperative shift in orientation. As this chapter outlines the selected theories and models, the reader should also consider the validity of these models in depicting the shift in orientation from interest-based to position-based negotiation. The main purpose of this chapter is to examine those models and concepts which suggest that negotiations vacillate between the distributive and integrative cycles of the researcher's model.

#### A. MODEL OF ORGANIZATIONAL REACTION TO CONFLICT

March and Simon (1958, p. 129-131) presented their taxonomy of Organizational Reaction to Conflict which proposed four ways organizations deal with conflict: *problem-solving*, *persuading*, *bargaining*, and *politicking*.

According to March and Simon, when problem-solving (PROBSOLV) is evident, the participants to the dispute are seen as *a priori* sharing common objectives and involving themselves in a high risk but integrative process of identifying a solution that satisfies both parties' criteria. Though no prerequisites to PROBSOLV, trust and cooperation between the parties are likely to be evident (Clopton 1984).... In the use of persuasion (PERSUADE) to resolve conflicts, each party is seen as attempting to alter the other party's perspective or decision criteria relating to the focal issue(s). In effect, the aim is to reduce differences in participant subgoals. The critical difference between PERSUADE and PROBSOLV is the former's "persuasive" intent; that is, the focus is on moving the other party toward a common set of goals.... Under the bargaining (BARGAIN) scenario, common goals are not expected. Indeed, disagreements over objectives are viewed as fixed.... In applying politics (POLITIC), though the parties enact behaviors based on a BARGAIN format, there is an assumption of fixed disagreement over goals and a zero-sum orientation. (Dant & Schul, pp. 39-40)

In contrast to subsequent models, March and Simon's taxonomy has placed conflict handling "reactions" into four categories instead of setting up a continuum or gradient of reactions, i.e., a competitive to neutral to cooperative continuum. Another unique feature of the March and Simon taxonomy is in its focus on organizational reaction (a systems view). This organizational concern differs from the concerns of subsequent theories which examined personality traits and other specific factors. March and Simon's model stands out as a *taxonomy of conflict management processes*, yet we can use their theory to explain the behaviors observed in negotiations as taking place along a strategic continuum.<sup>1</sup> The theory of Organizational Reaction to Conflict presents an extremely effective framework in which to examine the "shades of gray" between the two polar opposites of the continuum: position-based and interest-based.

## **B. TIT-FOR-TAT STRATEGY**

Tit-for-Tat is essentially the strategy of an "eye for an eye," or *quid pro quo*. Tit-for-Tat begins by seeking the highest payoff through a series of mutually cooperative transactions, thus the Tit-for-Tat player will begin a negotiation by playing cooperatively. In each subsequent transaction, the Tit-for-Tat player deals cooperatively in response to the other participant's cooperation; competitively with the other's competitiveness, i.e., it repays tit for tat. The underlying principle of Tit-for-Tat is that of behaviorism. Specifically, Tit-for-Tat employs both positive and negative reinforcement of behavior. Dixit and Nalebuff (1991, p. 107) credit Anatol Rapoport with having devised a winning computer model which used the Tit-for-Tat Strategy. The Tit-for-Tat strategy is effective in preventing the other side from exploiting us, while allowing us the flexibility to respond cooperatively to their cooperative behaviors. Tit-for-Tat is, however, a follower strategy, i.e., the Tit-for-Tat *player* reacts to the other. Since the Tit-for-Tat strategy sets us up

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<sup>1</sup> The researcher's model (Figure 1) incorporates this approach

to react competitively to competitive signals, our misinterpretation of our counterpart's behavior may cause us to compete when cooperation is more appropriate. Accordingly, if our counterpart uses Tit-for-Tat and misinterprets our behavior, he or she may react inappropriately. *"No matter what strategy you choose, you cannot have any effect on what your partner sees."* (Dixit and Nalebuff, 1991, p. 112) Tit-for-Tat is fundamentally a position-based strategy which falls short of effectiveness because it misses an opportunity for leadership in negotiations. Specifically, Tit-for-Tat provides no positive incentive or trust-building, which might lead our counterpart to shift from competitive behavior and become more cooperative. Said another way, Tit-for-Tat fails to acknowledge that human interaction is far more complex than its—stimulus-response, reward and punishment—behaviorist's underpinnings imply. The Tit-for-Tat strategy not only falls short in the normative judgments of many negotiators, it also fails their rational judgments because it abdicates the leadership and risk-taking necessary to create an opportunity to build a cooperative climate.

### **C. GRADUATED AND RECIPROCATED INITIATIVE IN TENSION REDUCTION**

Charles Osgood (1962) proposed Graduated and Reciprocated Initiative in Tension reduction (GRIT) as a more sophisticated version of Tit-for-Tat. Negotiators following the GRIT approach begin by communicating their intentions to deal cooperatively. As with Tit-for-Tat, GRIT negotiators punish uncooperative behavior; however, GRIT negotiators reiterate their intentions to deal cooperatively after each punishment. Following punishment and reiteration, GRIT negotiators resume the process of dealing cooperatively. Along with the same behaviorist principles used in Tit-for-Tat, GRIT incorporates some persuasive intent, but this persuasive element is incomplete.<sup>2</sup> Consequent to this need for

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<sup>2</sup> GRIT couples an "assurance" with an unconditional move as defined by the "response rule." (Nalebuff and Dixit, 1991, 124-126) An assurance is simply a promise to perform some task, unconditionally. In


improvement, Osgood (1979) refined the GRIT strategy to improve its persuasive content. He determined that negotiators should stipulate their specific cooperative intentions and extend an invitation to reciprocate. The findings reported from Lindsfold, et al (1986) indicate that (1) specific announcements of intentions were unnecessary, general announcements were sufficient, and (2) the announcement is more effective when followed by an invitation to respond cooperatively. Variants of the GRIT strategy allow for negotiators to grant forgiveness of their counterpart's competitive play. This variant of GRIT provides the negotiator with the flexibility to ignore some competitive signals and thus avoid reacting to misinterpretation.

#### **D. TRIANGLE MODEL**

The Triangle Model (Kelley and Stahelski, 1970) (see Figure 11) suggests that those negotiators having the competitive orientation will see their counterparts as competitive (one point of the triangle) and will only choose to compete. This model also supposes that cooperatives recognize, in their counterparts, both competitiveness and cooperation (the other two points). According to the triangle model, cooperatives will match the strategy that they read in their opponents. They will act cooperatively with others whom they perceive as cooperative; competitively with competitiveness. Other researchers have provided ample evidence to refute the premises of this short lived model. According to Lindsfold, Walters, and Koutsourais (1983), competitors may cooperate, but less than cooperators.

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GRIT, the initial cooperative move is unconditional; it occurs regardless of circumstances. By providing the assurance, then performing the unconditional move, the GRIT negotiator establishes credibility. The response rule also incorporates conditional moves: *threats* or *promises*. A threat can be either deterrent (promising to punish "wrong" behavior) or compellent (an ultimatum demanding "right" behavior). A promise can be either deterrent (affirming reward for avoiding "wrong" behavior) or compellent (affirming reward for "right" behavior). If the negotiator has established credibility in using the GRIT strategy, then this history, which includes punishing wrong behavior, sets up a heavily veiled threat, i.e., "figure out that I expect you to repay my cooperation, or I will punish you." In Osgood's (1979) revised GRIT, the act of assuring cooperation, and inviting the same more clearly spells out the demand for cooperation. Revised Grit also provides a more pronounced, albeit veiled threat.




**Figure 11. Triangle Model (Kelley and Tahelski, 1970)**

Also, Williams refutes the outcome that the Triangle Model predicts for competitor versus competitor. According to Williams, two effective competitors will recognize their situation and become cooperative. From William's perspective on the Triangle Model's theory, two questions remain. How do these "cooperating" competitors negotiate? Do they use an interest-based approach, or do they use a position-based, yet cooperative approach? The Triangle Model also raises another important question: do position-based negotiators only see negotiations as position-based, and interest-based negotiators see both position- and interest-based? If the concepts in the Triangle model can be applied to cross-

over theory, we might aid our counterparts in "crossing over" to interest-based negotiation by explaining the interest-based tenets (or even by informing them that interest-based negotiation exists). In fact, Lamm (1997) submits that a lack of understanding of interest-based negotiation presents a substantial barrier to its use.

#### **E. SPIRAL-REINFORCEMENT MODEL**

Zand's (1971) Spiral-reinforcement Model outlines the relationship between (1) the intentions one party has towards the other, (2) the expectations one party has of the other, and (3) the degree of trust one party places in the other. As the model in Figure 12 illustrates, one party (P) has certain predisposed expectations of the other (O). Once P and O interact, P observes O's action, as Boyd's cycle would affirm. In P's observation, he notes the degree to which O's behaviors restrict the flow of information to P, resist influence from P, and seek to impose control of P. Based on this observation, P makes some judgment about O's trustworthiness (P's Orientation in Boyd's Cycle) P draws some conclusion that O's behavior confirms P's expectations and justifies P's degree of trust in O. (P's Decision according to Boyd). P then formulates his intentions and expectations regarding O's trustworthiness and behaves accordingly, i.e., P's behaviors may restrict information, resist influence, and seek to impose control to some degree. (P's action/O's observation) To the extent that these parties react to some display of trustworthiness (or lack of it), these behaviors, observations, etc., provide spiral reinforcement for continued trust or distrust. In the case of distrust, this cycle depicts a downward spiral when information is restricted and controls are sought.



**Figure 12. Model of the Interaction of Two Persons with Similar Intentions and Expectations Regarding Trust (Zand, 1971)**

Butler (1995, p. 487) concurred with Zand (1971) on two key points suggesting that: sharing information and building trust combine synergistically, *and* they are fundamentally the most important activities of a negotiation. Trust and information sharing are certainly substantial factors in interest-based negotiations. Furthermore, Butler's analysis (1995, p. 486) defined trust as a willingness to put one's fate in the hands of another, i.e., a willingness to accept a degree of influence from another. By illustrating the interrelationship of its three key factors, the Zand model contributes substantially to our understanding of both the shifting of negotiators' orientations and the factors which engender this shift. Butler found that the principles behind spiral reinforcement were consistent with the premises of Thomas' dual concern model. Specifically, the strong pursuit of self-interests (high levels of assertiveness) do not forestall trust building or

information sharing. The concept of spiral-reinforcement represents the antithesis of the cross-over dynamic. In spiral-reinforcement, actions are seen as solidifying a climate or organizational style of handling conflict. On the other hand, cross-over dynamics are seen as reversing a climate. These two concepts share the same underlying principles and are consistent with the "crude law of social relations." (Deutsch, 1973)

#### **F. THE "CRUDE LAW OF SOCIAL RELATIONS"**

The three tenets of the crude law of social relationships work together to show that (1) the negotiators' behaviors can establish the climate of a negotiation, (2) the climate of a negotiation can determine the negotiators' behaviors, and (3) deliberate behaviors can impel a shift in the climate of negotiations. The first two of these three tenets suggests that certain conditions determine whether (1) the group environment will determine individual behavior, or (2) whether behavior of the individual creates the group environment. The third tenet parallels the concepts first presented in Kurt Lewin's force field analysis theory. Force field analysis theory promoted the belief that a social group's values arise from both its social structure and the individual behavior of group members. Once established, both structure and behavior are "frozen;" therefore, change is difficult. The individual can bring about a change in group behavior by undertaking acts or shaping processes which first "unfreeze" the existing orientation of group members, second impel some change or "shifting", and third "refreeze" the new orientation. The cross-over dynamic thus entails the first two actions: unfreezing and shifting. Spiral-reinforcement involves the third, refreezing.

##### **1. "The Atmosphere of a Relationship Will Foster Certain Acts and Processes"**

The first tenet of the crude law underscores the difficulty in changing organizational culture or any other systems where well-established patterns of interaction exist.

A competitive atmosphere induces threat, coercion, deception, suspicion, rigidity, faulty communication, and so forth. A cooperative atmosphere, on the other hand, induces perceived similarity, trust, open communication, flexibility, concern for the other, emphasis on mutual interests, and attraction between parties. (Lindskold, Betz, and Walters, 1986, p. 99)

Deutsch's first law is consistent with the premises of March and Simon's (1958) theory on Organizational Reaction to Conflict, that an organization's systems, culture, purpose, etc., greatly determine the way that parties work out agreements. In the sense that negotiators come together and form their own organization, this group influences the behavioral patterns. Reflective of systems thinking, this law suggests that the organizational system as a whole determines which processes and acts the players will follow, and consequently, which outcomes they can expect, in other words, "structure influences behavior." (Senge, 1991, pp. 40-54)

The first tenet of the crude law logically explains a substantial challenge to fostering interest-based negotiation. The organizational system is often the predominant factor in determining whether parties move away from position-based activities, i.e., they adopt approaches such as problem-solving, low advocacy of specific position, etc. In other words, given the extent to which an organization prescribes roles which pit one party against the other, that organizational structure has burdened the process through which the parties must operate to find shared interests. However, since the factors which engender or spoil cooperation rely heavily on the behavioral dynamics of human interaction, we should expect cooperative behavior to promote a cooperative environment.

**2. "The Processes and Acts Characteristic of a Given Type of Social Atmosphere Will Induce That Very Atmosphere If Introduced Into a Newly Forming Relationship"**

In part, this tenet supposes that the acts in a new system have some degree of power in defining the relationship of the actors. At the outset, this power in defining their relationship gives them power to set up the social atmosphere which

governs the subsequent processes and acts. Told another way, "...the first steps set the wheels into motion to produce a whole series of related perceptions, actions, and reactions." (Lindskold, Betz, and Walter, 1986, p. 100) Osgood's GRIT approach embodies the theory behind the second tenet of Deutsch's law. Specifically, the fact that GRIT leads one's counterpart down the path of cooperation (even after a reprimand) rests on this second tenet of Deutsch's law. In other words, one of the underlying principles of GRIT is that "the processes and acts characteristic of a (cooperative) atmosphere will induce (cooperation) if introduced into a newly forming relationship" (Deutsch, 1973) Again, where this tenet is applied to cooperation and competition, the behavioral dynamics of human interaction may predominate as factors shaping the climate of interaction.

As discussed in the first tenet of the crude law, having particular processes is a more substantial requirement in building interest-based negotiation and less substantial in cooperative negotiation. The second tenet suggests that negotiators can change the atmosphere of a negotiation by implementing acts and processes. Accordingly, when negotiators implement the processes which characterize a certain atmosphere, they create that atmosphere (and foster the comparable orientation).

**3. "A Firmly Developed Atmosphere Will Be Readily Changed Should One Party Act Deliberately and Clearly In a Manner Contradictory to the Existing Atmosphere"**

Furthering Deutsch's Law, Lindskold, Betz, and Walters (1986) proposed the third tenet: that "Cooperation can be spoiled and conflict can be resolved if one party acts deliberately (not accidentally) and clearly (not ambiguously) in a manner incompatible with that sort of relation."<sup>3</sup> (Lindskold, Betz, & Walters,

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<sup>3</sup> This notion that parties can "act deliberately and clearly" to either "spoil cooperation" or "resolve conflict" is the fundamental premise behind the researcher's model. For instance, when competitors follow the OODA loop, they respond to the other's behaviors. When these behaviors are seen as both threatening our own competitive behaviors and rewarding our cooperative behaviors, they tend to change the organizational climate towards PERSUADE and PROBSOLV, i.e., towards an integrative approach.

1986) This "third law" suggests that the parts can influence the whole (or that by applying sufficient force, the tail *can* wag the dog). As Lamm (1997) suggested:

In the negotiation I could try to portray or be a certain kind of person, but it could very well be that (some condition) creates a high pressure, high intensity. What's going to happen is that I would probably revert without even realizing to a nature, a behavior that I ordinarily would feel comfortable with....

In short, actors in an established negotiating relationship can follow fixed paths much like a phonograph needle might follow its fixed groove. If on any run, some force causes the needle to skip, then the needle fixes a new rut for itself, i.e., a rut which will cause the needle to skip in each subsequent run.

#### **G. FIVE CONFLICT-HANDLING MODES**

Widely cited in conflict management literature, Thomas and Kilmann's (1976) Five Conflict-handling Modes is one of the cornerstone models addressing negotiator orientation as a factor of personal characteristics or intentions. From Thomas's theory, Figure 13 illustrates the dynamics between certain endowments—assertiveness and cooperativeness—and the integrative and distributive orientations. This class of dual concern models displaced the previously predominant single concern models and their "either/or" paradigm, i.e., either assertive or cooperative. Now a negotiator could be described as both assertive and cooperative. In Thomas's model, parties held specific strategic intentions in their approach to managing conflict. In competing, the party works assertively, but not cooperatively. In collaborating, the party works both assertively and cooperatively. Compromising represents the intermediate level of assertiveness and cooperation; simply put, compromising represents give and take. In avoiding, the party works neither assertively nor cooperatively. In accommodating, the party works cooperatively, but not assertively.





Figure 13. The Five Conflict-Handling Modes (Thomas, 1976)

### 1. Conflict-handling Modes and the Myers-Briggs Type Indicators

In Figure 14, Thomas and Kilmann (1975) have recreated their model to show correlations between certain dimensions of strategic intentions and dimensions of Jungian character traits as measured by the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator.<sup>4</sup> Their 1975 study showed that “the Jungian functions related to judging (thinking vs. feeling) and the type of enactment (introverted vs. extroverted) are significantly related to an individual’s conflict handling behavior.” (Thomas & Kilmann, 1975, p. 971) In the *integrative dimension*, our strategic intentions move along a continuum from avoiding (low assertiveness/low cooperation) to

<sup>4</sup> The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator is a forced-choice personality survey which seeks to measure four Jungian dimension: *Introversion* vs. *Extroversion*, *Sensing* vs. *Intuitive*, *Thinking* vs. *Feeling*, and *Perceiving* vs. *Judging*. Among the several other instruments which measure the same four dimensions, the Keirsey-Bates version is widely used.

collaborating (high assertiveness/high cooperation). Their study suggests that extroverts tend to collaborate, and introverts tend to avoid. In the *distributive dimension*, our strategic intentions move along a continuum from competing (high assertiveness/low cooperation) to accommodating (low assertiveness/high cooperation). Their study also suggested that thinking has a high correlation to competing, and feeling, a high correlation to accommodating.<sup>5</sup>



**Figure 14. Conflict-handling behavior as a reflection of the Jungian dimensions of Thinking-Feeling and Introversion-Extroversion (Thomas & Kilmann, 1975)**

<sup>5</sup> In a small sample of 19 military officers in a Naval Postgraduate School program management course, 11 were ESTJs according to the Keirsey-Bates version of the Myers-Briggs type indicators. Each of these 11 officers also tested highest in high assertive behaviors: Collaborating, Competing and Compromising. This small sample also manifested unusual patterns. For instance, the author's results, INTJ, are consistent with uncooperative approaches; however, his Thomas-Kilmann results were high assertive. Perhaps certain professions or roles foster mock behaviors, e.g., the Thinking/Introvert military officer will behave as a thinking/extrovert when carrying out that role.

## 2. The Aggressive/Assertive Continuum


Aronson's (1984) social-psychological work, particularly his writings on aggression, corroborates the conclusions offered by Thomas. The link between aggression and assertiveness amplifies how certain cross-over dynamics might unfold. Aggression as Aronson describes it, involves (1) hostile aggression, or aggression for aggression's sake, and (2) instrumental aggression, aggression to achieve some end. (Aronson, 1984) Hostile aggression is generally the result of emotional reaction and is typically brought about by motives such as vengeance or anger. Hostile aggression is not designed to accomplish some end; it is its own end. Instrumental aggression is generally the result of the orchestrated use of force or coercive power and is typically employed to satisfy the need for control through punishment. Instrumental aggression need not be personal and can be indirect. This is the case when one party subverts the others BATNA. For example, Tim hopes to establish a monopoly and sell beans to Mary and Sue, but Sue declines. Tim discovers that Sue is buying from Peter. If Tim makes some effort to buy Peter out (or even burn Peter out) to achieve a monopoly, Tim has shown instrumental aggression.

Thomas focuses on the degree of assertiveness as "the party's desire to satisfy one's own concerns." (Thomas, 1976, p. 900) These propensities suggest another continuum<sup>6</sup> (see Figure 15) which illustrates a trade-off between a party's willingness to either interfere with another or defend its own interests. In

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<sup>6</sup> Instead of this linear continuum, we might set these modes of force employment along a circular continuum. At twelve o'clock, the most effective mode is *assertiveness*. Proceeding clockwise to two o'clock, we find *indirectness*, which is characterized by manipulateness and deceptiveness. (Patterson, 1996, p. 34) Still clockwise to four o'clock, we find *passiveness*, then *passive aggression* at six o'clock. From the apex proceeding counter-clockwise to ten o'clock, we find *instrumental aggression*; still further counter-clockwise to eight o'clock, we find *hostile aggression*; finally closing the circle at six o'clock with *passive aggression*. This circular model might be useful in illustrating how the modes of force we employ are less optimal as we move away from assertiveness—away from 12 o'clock and towards six o'clock; however, the linear continuum more easily fits within the Thomas-Kilman model to demonstrate excess concern for one's own interest.

considering negotiation effectiveness, the negotiating parties should strive to avoid the extremes and operate at an optimum position along the continuum. In other words, we expect effective negotiators to maintain a certain level of assertiveness which is neither aggressive nor passive.



**Figure 15. Aggressive/Assertiveness Continuum (proposed by the researcher)**

Following this hypothesis that assertiveness can be shown along a continuum of force which negotiators should use in the pursuit of their own goals, other research supports the view that negotiators can apply an optimal level of assertiveness. In a synthesis of Zand's mistrust model and Thomas' conflict handling modes model, Butler (1995) suggested that by strongly pursuing one's own interest, the negotiator would begin the downward spiral, i.e., the pursuit of self-interest would lead to a lack of trust, withholding information, and seeking to impose controls on others. However, Butler's (1995) findings supported a different conclusion: "pursuit of self-interest did not hamper trust." Although, Butler's research did not bear out his hypothesis, the findings presented seem to reconcile the Zand and Thomas models. Specifically, this research suggests that in collaboration, a negotiator can work both cooperatively and assertively (vigorously pursuing his or her own self-interest) and not necessarily create the downward

spiral of distrust. (Butler, 1995, p. 497) Again, the reasonable application of assertiveness (force to ensure self-interest) does not hamper agreement, but when others make aggressive attempts to impose their will, their aggression meets with our resistance and begins the downward spiral of resisting influence, fomenting mistrust, and supressing information.


## **H. PHASES OF NEGOTIATION PRESCRIBE NEGOTIATOR ORIENTATION**

Charles Craver (1995) suggests that negotiator orientation changes as the parties enter different phases of negotiation. Craver suggests that negotiations characteristically contain four phases: an information phase, a competitive/distributive phase, a closing phase, and a cooperative/integrative phase. For example, during the information phase, negotiators ask questions regarding the circumstances, issues, etc. For Craver, this "fact-finding" phase, is characteristically integrative. Negotiator orientation shifts as the parties enter the competitive/distributive phase, which is characteristically competitive as its name suggests. In this phase, the parties articulate their specific demands. The negotiation remains competitive as the parties enter the closing phase, which is a critical, thus highly competitive phase in negotiations. Lastly, the negotiators enter the cooperative/integrative phase. During this final phase, the negotiators work to enhance joint gains through mutual accords. Once again, their approach becomes characteristically cooperative. Although his phase theory applies primarily to formalized legal negotiations, we can find merit in its underlying premise, that phases can influence negotiator orientation. Lamm (1997) suggests three more broadly applicable phases: fact-finding, narrowing the difference (problem-solving), and hard bargaining. Since fact-finding is characterized by the act of information sharing (and likely the trust and acceptance of influence suggest by Zand) this phase is the most conducive to interest-based negotiation. As the

negotiation progresses, particularly towards the hard bargaining, we expect the negotiators to review the discussion and revise their statements in an attempt to bolster their positions. (Lamm, 1997) This may drive the parties towards the position-based approach.

# **I. CROSS-OVER MECHANICS: ORGANIZATIONAL REACTION TO CONFLICT DEPICTED AS A SINGLE CONCERN**

Arising from the researcher's model (above in Figure 1), the central issue of this study is the existence of the cross-over dynamic. This single concern model places March and Simon's (1958) taxonomy along the Distributive/Integrative continuum shown in Figure 16. This continuum shows that from left to right, the organizational reaction to conflict changes from position-based to interest-based, respectively. In this diagram, problem-solving is seen as a wholly integrative activity. Persuading can be applied to a wide range of approaches from integrative, to equitable, to maximalist positions. Bargaining and politicking generally exist in position-based negotiation. Presented another way, problem-solving is characteristically an interest-based process; persuade, characteristically cooperative, i.e., persuade has its greatest utility in either interest-based or cooperative position-based negotiation; politic and bargain are characteristically position-based. As March and Simon (1958, p 129) explain "in the problem-solving process the importance of assembling information is stressed, search behavior is increased, and considerable emphasis is placed on evoking new alternatives." Where negotiators come together and treat information as a collectively owned resource, they have organized into a problem-solving group; they have handled the problem in a wholly integrative manner. Outside of the interest-based approach, problem-solving is risky and offers less utility, thus we have placed it on the far right end of the position-based interest based continuum. "In the case of persuasion, it is assumed that individual goals may differ within the



**Figure 16. Model of Organizational Reaction to Conflict**  
(Adapted from March & Simon, 1958)

organization but that goals need not be taken as fixed.” (March and Simon, 1958, p. 129) In persuasion, information exchange is less important than in problem-solving. Persuasion typically uses information to influence others to modify their subgoals (or positions), or in the case of interest-based negotiations, persuasion generally uses information to modify the underlying assumptions or principles that negotiators may hold. Problem-solving and persuasion are the most useful approaches in interest-based negotiation; however, the advocacy component of persuade makes it also useful in position-based negotiation. Of the four styles, persuade is the most versatile conflict handling approach, but it is most effective in interest-based and cooperative position-based approaches. In cases where a position-based negotiation is outside of the cooperative sphere, our counterparts will be less open to persuasion, thus persuade loses its effectiveness. In the cases where the negotiation is both position-based and not cooperative, negotiators use bargaining and politicking. “Where bargaining is used, disagreement over goals is taken as fixed, and agreement without persuasion is sought.” (March and Simon, 1958, p. 130) In other words, in bargaining we might agree to disagree, but then look for areas where compromise is possible so that we can satisfy some of our

desires. Typically bargaining involves the tools of gamesmanship: some degree of deception and power-wielding. (March and Simon, 1958, p. 130) As with bargaining, negotiators engaged in politicking see the substantive issues of negotiation as fixed according to their respective positions; however, in politicking "the arena of bargaining is not taken as fixed by the participants." (March and Simon, 1958, p. 130) In other words, the gamesmanship of politicking is carried out through alliances which arise out of inter-group conflict; our side against yours. Under politicking, parties seek to frame the conflict as more complex than bilateral. March and Simon suggest that problem-solving and persuading are used more to resolve individual conflict; bargaining and politicking, to resolve intergroup conflict.<sup>7</sup> Because an essential characteristic of politicking is its reliance on intergroup conflict, it is more difficult to set aside positions and examine underlying interests. For this reason, politicking is the least conducive to interest-based negotiation and belongs on the left end of the continuum.

Through the proposed model (Figure 16 above), the researcher intends to convey that behaviors and other factors shape the organizational reaction to conflict which in turn promotes a certain negotiator orientation. In other words, the same dynamics that contribute to spiral-reinforcement can work in reverse as cross-over factors. Said yet another way, by behaving in a way that would distinctly reinforce one particular orientation, a party can undo or even reverse a situation characterized by the opposite negotiator orientation. By setting the categories of organizational reaction to conflict along a continuum, we illustrate a pathway similar to that suggested in the third aspect of the crude law of social relations: "a firmly developed atmosphere will be readily changed should one party act deliberately and clearly in a manner contradictory to the existing atmosphere. Cooperation can be spoiled and conflict can be resolved if one party

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<sup>7</sup> March and Simon grouped problem-solving and persuading together as the analytic processes to resolve conflict; bargaining and politicking are grouped as the bargaining processes.

acts deliberately (not accidentally) and clearly (not ambiguously) in a manner incompatible with that sort of relation" (Deutsch, et. al, 1986, p. 100)

March and Simon's theory on Organizational Reaction to Conflict offers categories through which we can recognize "shades of gray" between interest-based and position-based negotiation. In this way, we can see negotiator orientation not as an either/or proposition, but as shifting gradually along an interest-based/position-based continuum. While March and Simon's taxonomy parallels this interest-based/position-based continuum, it helps us explain and predict perceptible changes in reaction to conflict by drawing appreciable distinctions between four conflict management styles.

## **J. SUMMARY**

March and Simon's theory on the organizational reaction to conflict suggests that people approach negotiations and conflict handling in a manner characteristic of the organization's particular style, thus a change in the organization can promote a cross-over to some desired orientation. Tit-for-Tat was designed to promote a cross-over from a competitive orientation to a cooperative orientation by (1) rewarding those behaviors consistent with the desired cooperative orientation, and (2) punishing behaviors consistent with the undesirable competitive (or even hostile) orientation. GRIT is based on the premise that we can foster a cross-over (competitive to cooperative) by communicating our cooperative intentions, acting cooperatively, punishing uncooperative behavior, and reaffirming our preference to deal with mutual cooperation. The Triangle Model suggests that our competitive counterparts may be incapable of cross-over to cooperative negotiation because they see the world as competitive. Accordingly, this model implies that the act of showing a competitive counterpart that we are likely to cooperate (and how that cooperation will work), is an essential first step. This theory may be even more valid in

explaining interest-based negotiations to people holding a position-based orientation. Spiral-reinforcement suggests that we can promote a cross-over to a specific orientation by: (1) the degree to which we exhibit mutual trust and trustworthiness, (2) the degree to which we seek to impose controls on the other, and (3) the degree to which we resist (or accept) influence. The third tenet of the crude law of social relations states that a firmly developed atmosphere can be reversed if we act deliberately and distinctly in a manner uncharacteristic of the existing atmosphere. The cross-over factor theory goes further to suggest that those behaviors and other factors characterizing the opposite orientation will cause negotiators to shift orientations, i.e., from interest-based negotiation to position-based negotiation or vice-versa.

Most of the theories and models presented above support the notion that behavioral interaction shape the negotiator's orientation. For instance, spiral reinforcement theory and the crude law of social relations provide mechanisms which outline how behavioral interaction changes negotiator orientation. Tit-for-Tat and GRIT go even further to prescribe behaviors to secure the desired negotiator orientation in our counterpart(s). Thomas' model suggests that certain personality traits or attitudes precede behavioral interaction and govern a party's tendency toward a specific conflict-handling orientation. Thomas has, however, discussed situational factors among the several variables recognized as affecting orientation. For example, Thomas explains that in a particular scenario "the collaborative orientation is partly a response to mutual identification." (Thomas, 1976, p. 900) As such, an orientation may be induced by factors not restricted to traits or endowments alone—orientation may be affected by several variables including situational factors. Accordingly, since the literature has identified behavioral factors, process factors, and structural factors affecting orientation, research should consider these factors or groupings of variables as potential cross-

over factors. Several of the models presented in this chapter suggest that some sort of cross-over dynamic exists. Furthermore, the creators of these models offered empirical evidence to show that negotiators will change their orientation from competitive to cooperative, and vice versa, given the presence of certain conditions or factors. Taken primarily from three studies, the next chapter presents a set of conditions considered among a host of potential cross-over factors.

#### IV. FACTORS AFFECTING NEGOTIATOR ORIENTATION

This chapter presents a collection of "cross-over factor candidates" drawn primarily from three different studies and addressing three different research concerns. As the factors are presented, the researcher offers limited analysis of the underlying hypothesis to determine whether the factor has a positive or negative effect on cooperative or integrative negotiation. Those factors showing negative effects on cooperation or integrative negotiation can be considered as factors promoting competition or distributive negotiation. For example, since research suggests that high anxiety decreases cooperation, we presume it increases competition. To simplify the analysis, the factors are presented as promoting cooperation. It follows that the discussion will address how high levels of some factors foster cooperation, e.g., high trust, while low levels of other factors have the same effect, e.g., low anxiety. In the first study presented, Dant and Schul (1992) outlined factors which are common to either (1) Probsolv and Persuade or (2) Bargain and Politic. Concerning March and Simon's organizational reactions to conflict, Dant and Schul offer insight into interest-based and position-based negotiations, respectively. In the second study presented, Hermann and Kogan (1977) examined eight personality characteristics or psychological factors. This study considered how these factors promoted either competitive or cooperative orientations in negotiators. In the third work presented, R. W. Johnston (1982) presented a set of factors which he asserted would cause a shift from competition to collaboration. Theories from several studies are presented at the end of this section to offer single candidates for consideration on the list of cross-over factors.

## A. A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING THE CHOICE OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION METHODS

This subsection examines the framework through which Dant and Schul (1992) presented a set of hypotheses to predict the organizational reaction to conflict as outlined by March and Simon (1958). Comprised of a collection of hypotheses derived from several different fields of study, this framework suggests five major characteristic categories of the cross-over factors: issue, relationship, environmental, structural and personality.

### 1. Issue Characteristics

Dant and Schul (1992, p. 41) reported that Probsolv and Persuade were more prevalent than Bargain and Politic whenever *issues* involved high stakes or high complexity. Citing Walton and McKersie (1965), they linked high incidents of Probsolv and Persuade to issues involving **high stakes** (only in symmetrical settings)<sup>1</sup>. The underlying hypothesis is that "greater stakes may tend to justify the commitment of greater resources generally required in interest-based negotiation." (Dant & Schul, 1992, p. 41, and Walton & McKersie, 1965)

Dant and Schul (1992, p. 42) maintained that Probsolv and Persuade also accompanied negotiations where the issues involved **high complexity** (in symmetrical settings). The basis for their assertion is that greater complexity allows for a greater number of options and alternatives - the development of which are essential in interest-based negotiation. (Kolb & Glidden, 1986) Their analysis also considered opposing arguments. Complex issues take a degree of time and "psychic energy" which might not be available for their resolution. (Clopton, 1984) Additionally, they suggested that complex issues are often solved through abstractions (Pruitt and Lewis, 1975); in the abstract, the debate over issues often leads to dogmatic stands based on principles. (Blake & Mouton, 1962; Walton & McKersie, 1965) Their analysis is extensive but flawed in its citation of Pruitt

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<sup>1</sup> A symmetrical setting exists where the parties to a negotiation (or conflict) have relatively equal power at the bargaining table. Asymmetrical settings exist where power resides with one or a few parties.

and Lewis (1975, p. 628), who examined high *cognitive* complexity, and not high *issue* complexity. This factor, cognitive complexity, represents *a personality characteristic* and is discussed below in subsection C3.

## 2. Relationship Characteristics

Probsolv and Persuade also predominated whenever the negotiating *relationship* was characterized by high mutual control, high mutual trust, high interaction and mutual responsiveness, and frequent contact. (Dant and Schul, 1992) Cited in Dant and Schul, Anderson and Narus (1990) asserted that Probsolv and Persuade were more apparent in relationships involving a **high functionality of conflict**. Functionality of conflict is the mutual control or power that the negotiators hold to determine one another's future. "The more control that one player has over the others' outcome, the more likely the parties are to seek an integrative solution." (Anderson & Narus, 1990, pp. 62-74) Also cited, Stern and Reve (1980) reported that whenever parties rely heavily on one another, they tend to seek more integrative solutions since "[c]ooperation involves a combination of object- and collaborator-centered activity which is based on a compatibility of goals, aims, or values." (Stern & Reve, 1980, p. 57)

Anderson and Narus (1990) reported a high propensity for Probsolv and Persuade whenever parties displayed a **high degree of trust** (in symmetrical settings). The simple premise behind their assumption that "high trust promotes high cooperation." (Anderson & Narus, 1990) is affirmed by Zand (1971): "High trust promotes high information sharing, reduces the concern for placing controls on the other party." Zand's Spiral Reinforcement model further underscores the tenet that trust and cooperation are mutually supporting.

Probsolv and Persuade appear to be the primary approach whenever parties interact with a **high degree of relationalism**. From Kaufmann and Stern (1988), the term relationalism denotes the level of interaction and responsiveness exhibited between parties, i.e., the degree to which parties focus on their transactional

exchanges, give and take. The hypothesis behind this assertion is that "the more the exchange relationship, the relationship roles, and the mutual abilities of each party to observe the other support a sense of fair play, the higher the cooperation." (Kaufmann & Stern, 1988, pp. 534-52) (Macneil, 1981) Independently, Johnston (1982) further corroborated Dant and Schul's findings where he suggests that one "increase the amount of time spent in fact-finding meetings." (Johnston, 1982, p. 163) Here Johnston's advise not only places the parties in proximity, it puts them together in fact-finding, an activity that is central to interest-based negotiation.

Johnston (1982, p. 164) also suggested that negotiators can promote collaboration by showing other members of the organization increased attentiveness, which is comparable to responsiveness. Additionally, Johnston (1982, p. 164) suggested that negotiators could foster *collaboration* through "[a]n orientation toward goals and a willingness to implement suggestions."

Perreault and Miles (1978) contended that Probsolv and Persuade became more dominant in organizations as the frequency of contact between parties increased: "the frequency with which the focal person and target person engage in work required contacts." (Perreault & Miles, 1978, pp. 23, 86-98) Stated more as a prescription, Johnston (1982, p.163) suggested that the negotiator "interact on a more direct, face-to-face basis."

### 3. Environmental Characteristics

Probsolv and Persuade were evident whenever *environmental factors* imposed a high degree of uncertainty or fostered a high degree of munificence. (Dant and Schul, 1992) Research has not clearly established what affect a **high degree of uncertainty** has on negotiator orientation. Achrol, Reve and Stern (1983, p. 64) suggested that under high uncertainty participants are more cooperative. However, Achrol et al, also hypothesized that high uncertainty leads to greater conflict, which typically fosters competition. Furthermore, Lindsfold, Walters, and Koutsourais (1983, pp. 521-532) raised a question to the contrary:

"Investigators should continue to explore the degree to which competitors act competitively because of uncertain information." Dwyer and Oh (1987, pp. 347-58) contended that Probsolv and Persuade were evident whenever the parties interacted with a **high degree of munificence**. In other words, when parties behave with generosity, they are more likely to pursue an integrative solution.

#### 4. Structural Characteristics

Probsolv and Persuade were broadly exhibited whenever the negotiating *structure of the organization* was characterized by a high level of integration (or by diminished support for some position-based reward structure as other evidence suggests). Dant and Schul (1992, p. 41) contended that Probsolv and Persuade were evident whenever negotiators worked within a structure that reflected **high organizational integration**<sup>2</sup> (in symmetrical settings). While Stern and Reve's (1980 ) research addressed integrative benefits of certain formal channels and configurations (such as vertical integration), the concept of high organizational integration has broader implications for connecting through informal channels. In addition to Dant and Schul's findings above, a **diminished position-based reward structure** may foster interest-based negotiation. Johnston (1982, p. 163) suggested that "Rules of the Game" that do not incentivize conflict and that do not fail to punish aggression foster collaborative negotiation.

#### 5. Personality Characteristics

Probsolv and Persuade were preferred whenever *personality characteristics* reflected high self-esteem and high similarity between negotiators. (Dant and Schul, 1992) Dant and Schul's findings on self-esteem are presented below in section C, the *Eight Personality Characteristics*. (Hermann & Kogan, 1977)

Researchers have reported a greater likelihood of Probsolv and Persuade in cases where negotiators shared common personal circumstances. This **high**

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<sup>2</sup> These findings specifically addressed the marketing channels of supplier to producer to distributor. Where these marketing channels were vertically integrated, the various parties were more likely to work out their differences through integrative means.

similarity of social class, education, race, common experiences engenders mutual cooperation. "Greater similarity between buyers and sellers is related positively to more problem-solving-oriented strategies used by buyers (and)...sellers." (Campbell, et. al) 1988, p. 52) Framed another way, high similarity may tend to reduce suspiciousness, one of the eight personality characteristics named below.

## **B. SHIFTING FROM COMPETITION TO COLLABORATION**

In Lewicki (1985), Johnston's reprinted article *Negotiation Strategies: Different Strokes for Different Folks* specifically addressed the factors which provide an opportunity to shift the negotiations towards the collaborative, or interest-based. Although, the Johnston (1982) article does not cite or report the empirical results of experiments or studies, its value for this researcher arises from its direct concern for the interest-based orientation. Dant and Schul (1992) provided empirical evidence to suggest that the factors identified were predominant during problem-solving and persuasion, which represent the more integrative approaches. Johnston suggests that negotiators should actively seek to cross-over from the competitive to the collaborative (interest-based) orientation once they note the conditions listed below in Figure 17.

Better coordination of efforts  
Better division of labor and equitable distribution of work.  
Internal or external motivation from individuals to achieve goals  
Increased amount of communication, particularly active listening to achieve understanding  
Mutual comprehension and common appraisals of communications  
Increased attentiveness to other members of the organization  
An orientation toward goals and a willingness to implement suggestions  
Increased productivity per unit of time  
Higher quality of product and more informed discussion about the job  
Friendliness during discussions

**Figure 17. Shifting From Competition to Collaboration  
(Johnston, 1982)**

The factors suggested in Figure 17 are presented in the next five subsections using Dant and Schul's (1992) framework.

### 1. Issue Characteristics

Mutual comprehension and common appraisals of communications decrease the opportunity for discrepant "thought processes, perceptions, or judgments" between negotiators. (Rahim, 1992 ) This discrepancy in understanding is referred to as *cognitive conflict*. "In its extreme form, two parties' inferences from the same data are logical contradictions of one another" (Cosier & Rose, 1977, p. 379) An orientation toward goals and a willingness to implement suggestions provides an atmosphere which supports discussion and dialogue on how to achieve goals instead of objectives. The willingness to implement suggestions further encourages the feedback and dialogue essential to integrative processes. When negotiators show a willingness to implement suggestions, they are being cooperative in the strict sense; coupled with the goal orientation, they bring about mutual problem-solving through cooperation and communication. The issues of higher quality of product and more informed discussion about the job represent goals and concerns which rely on effective coordination. In a practical sense, the quality movement has changed industry's traditional relationships so that suppliers, manufacturers, and distributors customarily abandon their past adversarial roles in favor of partnering arrangements. The quality movement has also led internally to more informed discussion about the job. A requirement of employee empowerment is the participation in integrative processes such as job design, process mapping, and product improvement. (Walton, 1986, pp. 121-238)

### 2. Relationship Characteristics

Increased attentiveness to other member(s) of the organization brings about a high degree of trust, a high degree of contact, and promotes active listening. Applied to negotiations, participants giving increased attentiveness to their

counterparts may promote the shift towards cooperative and ultimately interest-based negotiation. The mere act of giving increased attentiveness commits the involved parties to the concerns of others. As one of six principles of the unconditionally constructive strategy for interest-based negotiation, Fisher (1988, pp. 38, 64-83) prescribes understanding. "Even if they misunderstand us, try to understand them." (Fisher, 1988, p. 38)

### 3. Environmental Characteristics

The internal or external motivation from individuals to achieve goals can provide a powerful cross-over incentive depending on the source of motivation. Typically, negotiators feel pressure from a client who does not consider the best deal to be merely having his or her interests met. This client is satisfied by achieving victory over his or her counterpart. The external motivation or pressure provided by the client can thus drive negotiators towards the position-based approach. "However, depending on the source of constituent pressure (external motivation) you may see strong pressure on both sides from the same source, i.e., Congress, which drives negotiators towards the interest-based." (Wilkoff, 1997) An increased amount of communication, particularly active listening to achieve understanding provides an essential component to problems-solving and integrative approaches. As mentioned above in the discussion on increased attentiveness, improved interaction brings about a high degree of trust, a high degree of contact, and promotes active listening. Where Johnston prescribes increased attentiveness as a personal act, increased communication is a result of organizational change. Negotiators who want to apply this principle will create and use organizational structures and systems which facilitate interaction. For example, by isolating themselves at Camp David, statespersons set aside their other activities and increase their communication with one another. They also remove the distractions of media and other third parties. Once removed from

public view, they have less motivation to engage in grand standing; they are less concerned with rhetoric and more concerned with understanding. Johnston's suggestion that friendliness during discussions is a collaborative force is supported by the findings reported above in high munificence studies. (Dwyer and Oh, 1987, pp. 347-58) Again, integrative behavior often incorporates conflict resolution and tension reduction.

#### 4. Structural Characteristics

Better coordination of efforts, better division of labor, and equitable distribution of work each involve the effective use of resources. When the coordination and work effort processes are effective, the organization is more likely to achieve the results which its members expected from teamwork. Thus when negotiators team effectively, i.e., they have effective coordination or efforts, division of labor, and equitable distribution of work and responsibilities, they have a much greater capacity for problem-solving. "(Their) search behavior is devoted to finding mutually satisfying solutions to problems; utilizing logical, creative and innovative processes; and developing constructive relationships with each other." (Johnston, 1982, p. 159) Also when resource allocation presents inefficiency, ineffectiveness, or inequity, the parties involved perceive that the cost of working together is relatively high; accordingly, they will tend to adopt a scarcity mentality.<sup>3</sup> The most fleeting resource negotiators typically face is time. Johnston suggests that the increased productivity per unit of time will foster collaboration, in other words, the effective use of time helps people work together. Studies in time pressure do not substantially elucidate Johnston's supposition that the effective use of time or the *increased benefit of time fosters collaboration*. Carnevale and Lawler (1987) report that:

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<sup>3</sup> While the researcher presents the economic paradigm, high cost-benefit ratios foster the scarcity mentality, Covey (1991, pp. 61-62) suggests that "(m)ost people are deeply scripted in the scarcity mentality. They see life as a finite pie..." He suggests that character sets up this abundance mentality.

When negotiators adopted a cooperative orientation, they achieved high outcomes regardless of time pressure. In combination with an individualistic orientation, time pressure produced greater competitiveness, firm negotiator aspirations, and reduced information exchange. In combination with a cooperative orientation, time pressure produced greater cooperativeness and lower negotiator aspirations. (Carnevale and Lawler, 1987, p. 636, also Wilkoff, 1997)

Against the background of the Carnevale and Lawler study, Johnston's supposition raises questions about the negotiators' orientation and their ability to respond to time pressure. Specifically, do cooperative (collaborative) negotiators *choose* to make better use of their time when under pressure? Will they develop "lower negotiator aspirations" as Carnevale and Lawler stated above? If so, then time pressure appears to be a force for compromise, even accommodation, but not necessarily collaboration. This conclusion would only suggest that if negotiators can derive greater utility from their time, i.e., increased productivity per unit of time, then cooperatives might be better able to assert their own self-interests. The studies here do not support that conclusion; moreover, we have uncovered no evidence that increased productivity of time will foster a shift from competition to collaboration.

## **5. Personality Characteristics**

Of the several factors presented above, none addresses personality characteristics. As factors, personality characteristics tend to be fixed, that is, they do not tend to be attributes that one could introduce into a negotiation to engender a shift in negotiator orientation. In the following section, we have examined the eight personality characteristics presented in Hermann and Kogan's (1977) research.

### C. EIGHT PERSONALITY CHARACTERISTICS

In their chapter, *Effects of Negotiators' Personalities on Negotiating Behavior*, Hermann and Kogan presented eight well-studied variables in a useful framework. "These eight characteristics were chosen because each has been used in more than one experimental study concerned with these traits that have examined orientation, process variables, or dyads." (Hermann & Kogan, 1977, p. 249) For each of the following eight characteristics, Hermann and Kogan wrote their hypothesis that the more (or less) of some characteristic a negotiator has, "the more cooperative is his/her orientation to a negotiating situation and the more cooperative is his/her negotiating behavior." The authors stress the distinction between negotiating *behavior* and *orientation*. Negotiating orientation refers to negotiators' intentions before interacting in actual negotiations. Hermann and Kogan (1977) examined the eight personality traits against three negotiator orientations. They described the competitive orientation as competing and expecting the other to compete. Cooperatives cooperate and expect cooperation. Exploitives compete and expect cooperation. None of the subjects in their Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) study cooperated when they expected competition. The three orientations the authors observed were essentially position-based orientations. Some of the authors' judgments about cooperative negotiation might not support conclusions about interest-based negotiation; however, these factors should be considered as candidates.

Some of the traits are more permanently fixed than others. Although a negotiator cannot introduce these fixed traits, we have examined them as possible, but not necessarily probable, cross-over factors showing latent effects. Other traits may be more transitory, in other words, they may reflect the attitudes of the present situation. They may also be role dependent. For instance, while it is generally a reflection of intellect and abstract thinking ability, a negotiator's

cognitive complexity depends on the subject matter, and thus it is situational. The negotiator's levels of anxiety, risk-avoidance, and suspiciousness also arise from the milieu of character traits and situational factors.

### **1. Low Anxiety**

Hermann and Kogan (1977) specifically discussed high anxiety as a competitive cross-over factor; consequently, the researcher has proposed that the less anxious a negotiator is, the more cooperative (less competitive) is the negotiator's behavior. Citing Baxter (1973) and Tedeschi Burrill, and Gahagan (1969), Hermann and Kogan suggested that high anxiety leads to high caution and a conservative approach. The authors added that the cautious typically select the minimax approach and adopt a competitive strategy. (Hermann & Kogan, 1977, p. 253) Their research findings, however, did not support their hypothesis. Hermann and Kogan (1977, p. 262) found that the "[h]ighest anxiety scores were found for subjects with a cooperative orientation; lowest anxiety scores were obtained for those with an exploitative orientation [those who plan to compete with others whom they expect to cooperate]."

### **2. Low Authoritarianism**

Hermann and Kogan (1977, p. 253) proposed the following: "The less authoritarian a negotiator is, the more cooperative is his/her orientation to a negotiating situation and the more cooperative is his/her negotiating behavior." Citing Ashmore (1969), Berkowitz (1968), Deutsch (1960), Wrightsman (1966), and Kelley and Stahelski (1970) in support of their hypothesis, the authors offered their underlying premise "that low authoritarians have an egalitarian orientation to the world...high authoritarians, according to Kelley and Stahelski, have an egoistic orientation." They conclude that low authoritarians hold an egalitarian orientation which supports a world view that all people are equally deserving, thus they work cooperatively with others. Accordingly, they conclude that high egalitarians harbor an egoism which supports a world view that self-interest resolves these

issues, thus they work competitively with others. The authors add one caveat: after initially having been exploited by high authoritarians, low authoritarians "may overreact and match or better the competitiveness of the high authoritarian." (Hermann & Kogan, 1977, p. 253)

### 3. High Cognitive Complexity

Citing research by Phelan and Richardson (1969), Harvey, et al. (1961), and Driver (1976), Hermann and Kogan hypothesized that cognitive complexity allowed negotiators to conceive outcomes other than the zero sum pay-off. In their research, subjects with low cognitive complexity typically endeavored to reduce their opponent's payoffs. Accordingly, the authors concluded that "the more cognitively complex a negotiator is, the more cooperative is his/her orientation to a negotiating situation and the more cooperative is his/her negotiating behavior." (Hermann & Kogan, 1977, p. 254) Hermann and Kogan's (1977, p. 262) research, however, suggested that exploitatives are the most cognitively complex, cooperators, moderate, and competitors, the least. On the other hand, Pruitt and Lewis (1975, pp. 621-33) reported that people exhibiting high cognitive complexity were more likely to pursue integrative solutions.

A personality variable, cognitive complexity(\*), was employed in this study. According to Schroeder, Driver, and Streufert (1967), more complex individuals entertain more alternative conceptions of a situation and gather and integrate more information when they have to make a decision. Reasoning from the thinking underlying the third postulate presented above, we hypothesized that more complex bargainers would achieve more integrative solutions, because they would gather more information about one another's utility structures and achieve more insights into how to integrate these utility structures. (p. 628)<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> The asterisks (\*) indicate where footnotes appeared in Pruitt & Lewis's original text. These footnotes work together to clarify that their variable, "conceptual complexity," is an "integrative capacity" for the negotiator. Conceptual complexity is "not related to IQ or academic achievement, it represents the ability to think abstractly. The *third postulate* mentioned in the quote is as follows: "A problem-solving orientation over-comes the difficulty in reaching agreement produced by higher limits."

It follows that a negotiator endowed with cognitive complexity would more handily follow the integrative steps of Fisher's Four step model. (Figure 7 above) To derive the creative solutions which interest-based negotiation typically demands, Fisher's method requires the problem-solver to analyze the situation by considering what is wrong *in theory* and what might be done *in theory*.

#### **4. High Tendency Towards Conciliation**

Hermann and Kogan (1977) suggest that the greater a negotiator's tendency toward conciliation as opposed to belligerence in interpersonal relations, the more cooperative is his/her orientation to a negotiating situation and the more cooperative is his/her negotiating behavior. Their research supports this belief. Citing research on belligerence and negotiator orientation, Ashmore, 1969; Wrightsman, 1966; Shure and Meeker, 1965:11; Shure, et al., 1966; the authors conclude that the opposite characteristic, conciliation, fosters cooperation. However, Hermann and Kogan (1977, p. 254) did not offer empirical evidence to support this hypothesis. Furthermore, they add the caveat that conciliatory and belligerent subjects provide a volatile mix; a conciliator may tend to overreact to the competitiveness of a belligerent negotiator. (Shure et al, 1966)

#### **5. High Dogmatism**

Citing Vacchiano, et al (1968), Hermann and Kogan argued that dogmatic negotiators tended to be more cooperative, but their rationale is both vague and indeterminate at best. According to the authors, the dogmatic person needed to have goals set by authority figures.

If the goal of the negotiation task, as explained by an authority figure (e.g., an experimenter, a reference group), is to earn as much money as possible, as is often the case in the PD, that goal can be integrated with the need for positive feedback by cooperation, particularly if one's opponent has tended to be cooperative.... Given the general inflexibility and resistance to change of the more dogmatic individual (see Vacchiano et al., 1969), once such subjects have

selected a cooperative strategy, they can be expected to pursue it tenaciously. (Hermann & Kogan, 1977, p.255)

From this logic, the authors surmised that "the more dogmatic a negotiator is, the more cooperative is his/her orientation to a negotiating situation and the more cooperative is his/her negotiating behavior." (Hermann & Kogan, 1977, p. 255)

#### 6. High Risk-Avoidance

Hermann and Kogan (1977, p. 255) hypothesized that "[t]he greater a negotiator's desire to avoid taking risks, the more cooperative is his/her orientation to a negotiating situation and the more cooperative is his/her negotiating behavior." (Shure and Meeker, 1965: 12), (Crowne, 1966), (Miller and Swanson, 1960) This hypothesis seems to contradict the authors' assertion above in 2a, that since the anxious are more inclined to be "cautious and conservative [risk-adverse] in an interpersonal situation, [t]hey expect the worst and try to minimize their losses by adopting a competitive strategy." (Hermann & Kogan, 1977 p. 253) In Hermann and Kogan's (1977, p. 255) study, they concluded that the high risk-avoiding personality trait led to greater incidents of cooperative behavior and a cooperative orientation.

Five of the eight studies in Table 8.1 indicate a significant positive relationship between risk-avoidance and cooperation. Individuals who are risk-avoiders are described by Shure and Meeker (1965:12) as "unadventurous" and "unwilling to expose themselves to dangers or hazard risks of either a material or physical character." Crowne (1966) suggests that such individuals are more interested in reaching bargaining agreements than in using a competitive strategy, and bargaining agreements are more likely to occur if cooperative goals prevail over competitive ones. Miller and Swanson (1960) indicate that the parents of risk-avoidant persons emphasize the importance of being accepted and of finding and maintaining a niche for oneself in the interlocking roles that exist in present complex social organizations.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> This citation makes reference to Hermann and Kogan's Table 8.1 which is not shown.

In other words, we should expect those with the high risk-avoidance characteristic to "play by the rules." These findings seem to be counterintuitive, perhaps erroneous. Simply put, we expect the high risk-avoidance persons to play it safe and maximize their payoffs by using their dominant strategy, which in the Hermann and Kogan study was the competing strategy.<sup>6</sup>

As Hermann and Kogan (1977, p. 266) noted, regardless of whether the subjects' risk preference was high or low, their cooperative behavior increased, thus for risk-avoidance, neither preference, high nor low, is expected to foster the cross-over from cooperation to competition. Moreover, since cooperation increased for both low and high risk preferences, we might also suspect that some other variable, such as trust, had a greater effect on the dynamics of the negotiation. Hermann and Kogan (1977, p. 261) also noted the mean scores for the risk avoidance personality variable showed no significant relationship to the subjects' initial orientation, cooperative or competitive. Both the mixed results from various researchers and the illustrations taken from the simulation support the conclusion that neither the high nor the low risk-avoidance traits engenders a specific initial orientation or negotiating behavior.<sup>7</sup> Accordingly, we might conclude that risk-avoidance is not a cross-over factor.

## 7. High Self-Esteem

Researchers disagree on whether high self-esteem promotes cooperation or competition. Raven and Kruglanski's (1970, pp. 69-107) research indicated that people high in self-esteem are more likely to use PERSUADE/PROBSOLV than

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<sup>6</sup> Since risk-avoidance is an economic behavior that can be expressed both algebraically and graphically, we can test Hermann and Kogan's conclusions using a spreadsheet model to produce the various utilities for each expected outcome given some particular risk preference.

<sup>7</sup> Using the utility function,  $U=ax^b$ , the model was constructed to determine the utility of either competing or cooperating, given the same payoffs used in Hermann and Kogan's prisoner's dilemma problem. For  $a < 1$ , the relative utility of *competing* was higher as  $b$  increased; for  $a \geq 1$ , the relative utility of *cooperating* was higher as  $b$  increased.

BARGAIN/POLITIC behavior. Maslow's theory would suggest that a self-actualizing person would be high in self-esteem, and predisposed to use problem-solving. Cited in Hermann and Kogan (1977), Pepitone (1964) suggested that people who are high in self-esteem have confidence, expect success, and are more likely to take advantage of situations offering them greater reward, thus they are more competitive. Hermann and Kogan also cited Faucheux and Moscovici's (1968) findings that high self-esteem supported a feeling of entitlement. The authors' research findings concluded that competitiveness are highest in self-esteem, exploitatives, moderate, and cooperatives, lowest.

#### **8. Low Suspiciousness**

Hermann and Kogan (1977, p. 256) proposed that "the less suspicious a negotiator is, the more cooperative is his/her orientation to a negotiating situation and the more cooperative is his/her negotiating behavior." Citing Shure and Meeker (1965), the authors indicated that suspiciousness creates distrustful and selfish behavior. They also suggested that the suspicious negotiator is likely to work to adopt a kill or be killed approach. (Scott and Lyman, 1968) They further supposed that in a mixed dyad, the trusting member could, over time, induce the suspicious member to make integrative choices. The authors concluded by proposing that a dyad of two highly suspicious negotiators would be most likely to compete.

Herrman and Kogan (1977, p. 267) acknowledged that the work of tackling personality factors was more complicated than they expected. Both their review of the literature and their experiments consistently support their hypotheses that high conciliation, low suspiciousness, low dogmatism, and low authoritarianism support cooperation. By applying economic principles, we can show mathematically how the preference for cooperation or competition depends on the individual's utility function, thus low or high risk avoiders can prefer either

cooperation or competition. Still unresolved are the questions concerning how cooperation is affected by the other factors: anxiety, self-esteem, and cognitive complexity.

#### **D. OTHER POSSIBLE CROSS-OVER FACTORS**

The previous three sections presented frameworks for examining factors affecting negotiator orientation and behavior. This section presents a collection of four key findings. High reframing, high security of relative standing, and high extroversion foster an integrative orientation and integrative behaviors, while the highly collaborative strategic intentions tend to support the parties' enacting integrative behaviors.

##### **1. Reframing**

William Ury, author of *Getting Past No*, has suggested an integrative tactic called reframing; specifically, "redirecting the other side's attention away from positions and toward the task of identifying interests, inventing creative options, and discussing fair standards for selecting an option." (1991, p. 78) The more that reframing was evident during dialogue or discussion (Ury, 1991), and "[t]he more that parties define the problem as though no real conflict exists, the more likely they are to seek an integrative solution." (Johnston, 1982, p. 163) Under Dant and Schul's (1992) framework, the act of reframing belongs partly to issue and partly relationship characteristics. In other words, both the character of the relationship and the character of the issue determine how frequently the parties will engage in reframing.

##### **2. Security of Relative Standing**

In addition to the structural characteristics outlined by Dant and Schul (1992), Lindsfold et al. have suggested that whenever competitive parties perceive little risk of losing their relative standing, they are more likely to cooperate.

"Competitors are interested in their absolute as well as relative standing in a relationship and that, when they can safely do so, they will join in mutually beneficial cooperation." (Lindskold, et al., 1983, p. 530) In other words, the parties are more likely to cooperate if they expect the outcome of their deal to maintain or improve their rank or position (in money, percent ownership, etc.). Accordingly, this concept of security of relative standing suggests that by reducing parties' risk of losing their relative standing, negotiators can promote greater cooperation. The concept also suggests that high risk aversives will compete; low risk averse will cooperate.

### **3. High Extroversion**

Extroverts are energized by talking and working with people. (Keirsey & Bates, 1984, p. 14) As discussed in Chapter III, subsection G.1., strong extrovert personalities showed a high correlation with the collaborative orientation. "The strongest and most consistent correlations for this dimension [introversion-extroversion] are with the integrative dimension of conflict behavior, indicating that individuals higher on extroversion are more likely to strive for integrative solutions...there is also a tendency for extroversion to be related to assertiveness on all three instruments"<sup>8</sup> (Kilmann & Thomas, 1975, pp. 977.) Extroversion fits well within the framework of Dant and Schul's personality characteristics.

### **4. Collaborative Strategic Intentions**

As discussed in Chapter III, subsection G, strategic intentions represent an initial predisposition or negotiator orientation. For example, negotiators who are collaborative (both highly assertive and highly cooperative) are inclined to focus on both parties' needs or interests and pursue an integrative solution. (Thomas, 1976) As such the collaborative strategic intention may indicate a latent factor

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<sup>8</sup> The three instruments mentioned in the citation are Thomas and Kilmann's MODE instrument, the Lawrence-Lorsch instrument, and the Hall instrument.

which might be activated to bring about a cross-over from position-based to interest-based negotiation. On the other hand, a competitive strategic intention may prove to be more obstacle than cross-over factor for the negotiator who desires an integrative process. Continuing along this vein, suppose a negotiator succeeds in causing the shift towards interest-based. Let us also suppose that his or her counter-part has the competitive strategic intention. We should expect this competitiveness to serve as a latent factor which can undo the shift to interest-based negotiation with a second cross-over. While strategic intentions are primarily personality factors, they do not fit wholly within Dant and Schul's framework. Strategic intentions are shaped by the collective force which the issue, relationship, personality, environmental, and structural characteristics.

#### **E. THE CROSS-OVER FACTORS**

From the studies presented above, Figure 18 presents a list of potential cross-over factors. This list organizes these factors in the frame work provided in Dant and Schul's study, i.e., issue, relationship, environmental, structural, and personality characteristics.

- **ISSUE CHARACTERISTICS**
  - High stakes
  - High issue complexity
  - High mutual comprehension and commonality of appraisals of communication
- **RELATIONSHIP CHARACTERISTICS**
  - High functionality of conflict
  - High degree of trust
  - High reframing
  - High degree of relationalism
  - High frequency of contact
- **ENVIRONMENT CHARACTERISTICS**
  - High uncertainty
  - High munificence
  - High degree of activelisting
  - High internal and external motivation to achieve goals
- **STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS**
  - High organization integration
  - High coordination of efforts/equitable division of work
  - Diminished position-based reward structure
  - Increase productivity per unit of time
- **PERSONALITY CHARACTERISTICS**
  - Low anxiety
  - Low authoritarianism
  - High cognitive complexity
  - High tendency towards conciliation
  - Low dogmatism
  - High extroversion
  - High self-esteem
  - High similarity with other
  - Low suspiciousness
  - Collaborative Strategic Intentions

**Figure 18. The Cross-over Factors  
(Proposed by researcher)**



## **V. THE SOURCES OF CONFLICT AS ANTECEDENT TO INTEREST-BASED CROSS-OVER FACTORS**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

In the previous chapters, we have discussed the nature of transactions for both integrative and distributive orientations; we have discussed the dynamics behind the shifting between orientations; we have discussed the factors involved—the so-called “cross-over” factors. This chapter aims to help the reader consider how conflict emerges in the antecedent phases as outlined in the Sawyer-Guetzkow Model (Figure 2) in order to determine how the cross-over factors operate. For negotiators to apply or exploit a cross-over factor, they must recognize the source of conflict, then choose whether to resolve it distributively or integratively. In a general sense, some sort of conflict precedes all negotiation matters; accordingly, the intent of this chapter is to present a brief overview of the sources of conflict. Of these two orientations or approaches to resolve conflict, the distributive approach can be seen as a process for achieving victory—or at least maximizing payoff—from either an all-or-nothing or zero-sum prospective. The integrative approach can be seen as a process for removing conflict; thus for the shift from positions to interests, some factor or factors can be seen as resolving the sources of conflict.

The sources of conflict can be used as a framework in which to examine the antecedents to the cross-over factors. If the integrative approach can be seen as a process for removing conflict, then the cross-over factor is some activity or condition which removes or alleviates conflict. The antecedent to the position- to interest-based cross-over factor is the emergence of conflict. Conversely, if the distributive approach can be seen as a process for maximizing payoff according to a zero-sum perspective, then the cross-over factor is some condition which fixes differences. The antecedent to the interest- to position-based cross-over is the emergence of some incentive to take control in the process of determining one's

portion of a gain. These are the antecedents in a general sense. The intent here is not to present the antecedents to the cross-over factors previously listed since these factors may come in and out of vogue. From a broader perspective, the concept of antecedent conditions is brought out in the sources of conflict and their various contests over resources, values, goals, meaning, etc.

## **B. SOURCES OF CONFLICT**

Afzalur Rahim (1992) developed this classification of the sources of conflict from the literature of organizational behavior and management. Much of the effort in the integrative process goes towards de-conflicting; thus these sources of conflict offer insight and perhaps help explain the conditions preceding the cross-over from competition to cooperation, even position-based to interest-based.

The classification of conflict is often made on the basis of the antecedent conditions that lead to conflict. Conflict may originate from a number of sources, such as tasks, values, goals, and so on. It has been found appropriate to classify conflict on the basis of these sources for proper understanding of its nature and implications. (Rahim, 1992, p. 19)

The items presented in these subsections are classifications and definitions and were drawn from Rahim's (1992, pp. 19-21) brief description of the sources of conflict. Of the items presented below, the reader might consider the first two categories as broad classes of conflict rather than sources of conflict; however, knowledge of these two antecedent cases still benefit negotiators in their efforts to use cross-over factors. The next nine actually categorize conflict according to its source—values or meaning, goals, issues, and emotion.

### **1. Institutionalized vs. Noninstitutionalized Conflict**

Institutionalized conflict is described by the friction which arises when formally prescribed roles pit a set of parties against one another. For example, management and union representatives reflect institutionalized conflict in their mutual suspicion of one another regardless of personal qualities. "[Institutionalized conflict] is characterized by a situation in which actors follow

explicit rules, they display predictable behavior, and their relationship has continuity.” (Rahim, 1992, 21) Noninstitutional conflict is typically represented in racial conflict, ethnic conflict, and other situations where societal norms, not formally prescribed roles, pit persons against one another.

## **2. Realistic vs. Nonrealistic Conflict**

Any conflict can be viewed as either realistic or nonrealistic. As defined by Rahim (1992, p. 21):

[Realistic conflict] refers to incompatibilities that have rational content, that is, tasks, goals, values, and means and ends. Nonrealistic conflict occurs as a result of a party's need for releasing tension, and expressing hostility, ignorance, or error. Whereas realistic conflict is associated with 'mostly rational or goal-oriented' disagreement, nonrealistic conflict 'is an end in itself having little to do with group or organizational goals' (Ross & Ross, 1989, p. 139.)

Realistic and nonrealistic conflict more aptly denotes types of conflict than actual sources. We better understand whether the cross-over factor should be capable of dealing with real goals, tasks, and principles, once we know the extent to which the dispute represents some realistic conflict; we better understand whether the cross-over factor should be capable of dealing with tensions, confusion, or falsity by knowing the extent to which some nonrealistic conflict exists. For the next nine items, their underlying concern for values, goals, tensions, hostilities, means, ends, ignorance, and error coupled with their realistic and nonrealistic dimension represent some unique dispute situation.

## **3. Affective Conflict**

Also termed *psychological conflict*, affective conflict results when parties in the act of negotiation discover that they have different feelings and emotions about the issues. For example, John and Sarah agree that teen-age pregnancy is a problem; John favors educational programs for teen-aged girls, while Sarah favors tough laws providing for little public assistance and requiring fathers to pay child support. As they debate their proposed solutions to the problem, they discover that

they feel differently about the issue. John believes that teen-aged girls get pregnant because they lack self-esteem and are not fully aware of the birth control available. Sarah believes that teen-aged girls get pregnant because they and their boy friends lack personal responsibility. In short, John and Sarah both agree that teen pregnancy is a problem; however, they feel differently about that very issue. Values are generally the underlying factor in affective conflict. As we see in this example, parties involved in affective conflict can agree on the issues, but their different *feelings* about the issues can lead them to desire different outcomes.

#### **4. Conflict of Values**

Conflicts of values occur when parties are confronted with ideological differences. Also referred to as *ideological conflict*, an example of the conflict of values is the debate over the abortion issue. As the name implies, values are generally the underlying factor in the conflict of values. Conflicts of this nature present a substantial obstacle to overcome. Lewin's (1951) three step model offers an effective cross-over mechanism: unfreeze, change, then re-freeze. "Conflicts on political issues are more difficult to resolve through negotiations when positions are derived from broader values or ideologies. By separating values from interest, conflicts are easier to resolve, although the impact of such resolutions on the underlying values are largely unknown." (Druckman, et.al, 1988, p. 490) In Fisher's (1964) interests-first negotiating process, he referred to this separation of values from interests as fractionating conflict. (Druckman, et. al, 1988, p. 491)

#### **5. Goal Conflict**

Goal conflict arises when the participants in a negotiation desire two separate outcomes or consequences which are incompatible. "Goal conflict [reflects] the degree of competition for payoffs." (Cosier & Rose, 1977, p. 378) Position-based negotiation accepts goal conflict as inherent; interest-based negotiation does not. For example, two advertising executives from the same company pitch their ideas to a client, knowing that the sole upcoming promotion

will go to the person whose idea is chosen. Since both executives desire the promotion, they are facing goal conflict. Generally, the underlying factor in goal conflict is the desire to achieve some specific ends of a resource allocation plan.

## **6. Conflict of Interest**

Conflicts of interests arise when parties find themselves vying for the same resources, and each party prefers to allocate those resources differently. "When each party, sharing the same understanding of the situation, prefers a different and somewhat incompatible solution to a problem involving either a distribution of scarce resources between them or a decision to share the work of solving it." (Rahim, 1992, cited Druckman & Zechmeister, 1973, p. 450) For example, throughout the past several decades, the two political parties have played out a conflict of interest in the United States Congress. In deciding what portion of the Federal budget to cut, the Democrats have principally opted to cut defense spending; the Republicans, entitlements. Although they are typically played out in either an all-or-none, or zero-sum game, conflicts of interests can often be resolved through interest-based negotiation. The "Ugli Orange" problem<sup>1</sup> is a classic example of a conflict of interest resolved through integrative means. Fisher's four step model offers an excellent approach for treating conflicts of interests as mutual problems to be solved.

## **7. Cognitive Conflict**

Cognitive conflict is an awareness that two parties are using the same data or information and arrive at different conclusions. "In its extreme form, two parties' inferences from the same data are logical contradictions of one another." (Rahim, 1992, cited Cosier & Rose, 1977, p. 378) For example, even though both

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<sup>1</sup> In the "Ugli Orange" problem, two doctors are negotiating to buy Ugli Oranges on behalf of their medical research companies. The Ugli Orange is special, but in short supply. One doctor needs the Ugli Orange to prevent birth defects; the other, to develop an antidote for a nerve agent that terrorists are soon likely to deploy. Each doctor believes his cause should receive the highest priority. Through integrative bargaining and creative thinking, the doctors can achieve a pareto efficient solution. (Solution withheld for the benefit of some readers)

groups used the same aerial photos of the million man march, the Nation of Islam and the National Park Service reported different figures in their estimates of attendance levels. Different methods of reasoning and different capacities to reason (or ignorance and error) are the overarching factors in cognitive conflict.<sup>2</sup>

#### **8. Substantive Conflict**

Substantive conflict arises when the parties disagree on what the issues are. Whether or not their campaign rhetoric genuinely reflected their personal beliefs, the 1992 presidential campaign presented an easy-to-understand example of substantive conflict. For President Bush the central issue of the election was character; for then Governor Clinton, the economy. It was their debate over what the issues were which suggested substantive conflict.<sup>3</sup> Where the two disagreed on the facts concerning the economy (or even the Governor's character), they were engaged in another type conflict. Again, where the conflict centers around a disagreement over what the issues are—issues sometimes yet to be argued—the parties involved are dealing with substantive conflict.

#### **9. Retributive Conflict**

Retributive conflict emerges from the need to punish an opponent, or seek retribution. For example, a small business concern might allege that despite their being the lowest bidder, a contracting officer has improperly awarded a contract to another company. Suppose the contracting officer defends his position with clear logic, sound legal points, *and* a smug attitude. Even though the small contractor understands that the award was proper, he or she might elect to lodge a protest just to inconvenience the contracting officer. This conflict is strictly retributive. In the

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<sup>2</sup> We can conclude from Rahim that incompatible degrees of cognitive complexity can create conflict. As we discussed in Chapter III, cognitive complexity was found to be lowest in cooperatives, medium in competitiveness, then highest in exploitatives. This research did not address the interest-based approach, which undoubtedly requires the greatest degree of cognitive complexity.

<sup>3</sup> Substantive conflict is very similar to issue conflict, which occurs when two or more organizational members disagree on the solution to a specific problem.

vernacular, we commonly refer to retributive conflict as "having a bone to pick with someone."

#### **10. Misattributed Conflict**

"Misattributed conflict relates to the incorrect assignment of causes (behaviors, parties, or issues) to conflict." (Rahim, 1992, p. 21, cited Deutsch, 1977). For example, in the 1980s the increasingly conservative American voter fought to cut "welfare" entitlements because the Federal deficit was fast becoming unmanageable. In fact, at the end of the Reagan-Bush years, welfare spending accounted for approximately 11.6 percent of the budget expenditures, while Social Security and Medicare accounted for nearly 35.8 percent.<sup>4</sup>(Cahill, 1992) In 1994, the Republicans enjoyed extraordinary gains and took control of the Congress. Claiming their mandate to implement the "Contract with America," the Republicans marked welfare for reform, largely at the behest of an uninformed public. Misattributed conflict typically involves one or more parties jumping to conclusions. Said another way, when a party intentionally creates a misattributed conflict, we commonly refer to it as "scapegoating."

#### **11. Displaced Conflict**

Displaced conflict involves two types of problems. First, conflict can be displaced and misdirected towards an "innocent bystander." In other words, the real conflict is with some other party. For example, people often have disagreements with their employers. Since employers have a great deal of power over their employees, the employees often keep quiet. This situation sets the employee up to attack the first person who comes along, e.g., a spouse, the waiter, a co-worker. A second way in which conflict is displaced is when parties argue over inconsequential issues in order to avoid the real issue. For example, a couple

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<sup>4</sup> Cahill's listing of Major Entitlement Programs in FY 1992 showed social security and Medicare at 58.3 percent of mandatory spending; welfare (grants to states for Medicaid, food stamp program, supplemental security income program, family support payments to states [including Aid to Families with Dependent Children], earned income tax credit[s], and state child nutrition payments) at 19 percent of mandatory spending. The researcher estimated mandatory spending at 61 percent of Federal budget.

might argue vigorously over their next vacation site, when their real concern is the unresolved issue of an impending visit from one of their parents.

### C. SUMMARY

The sources of conflict establish a framework for examining the antecedent conditions to conflict; it is conflict which brings about the need for negotiation. The specific sources of conflict lay out the battle ground of the dispute--the battle ground of values, goals, tensions, hostilities, means, ends, understanding, perception, or emotion. If the integrative approach can be seen as a process for removing conflict, then the cross-over factor is some activity or condition which removes or alleviates conflict. Accordingly, the antecedent to the position-based to interest-based cross-over factor is the emergence of conflict. Conversely, if the distributive approach can be seen as a process for maximizing payoff according to a zero-sum perspective, then its cross-over factor is some condition which fixes differences. The antecedent to the interest-based to position-based cross-over is the emergence of some incentive impelling the parties to take control in the process of determining their portion of a gain. These are the antecedents to the cross-over factors in a general sense. Again, the intent here is not to present the antecedents to the cross-over factors previously listed since these factors may come in and out of vogue. Recent history from the study of leadership has shown this to be the case when scholars pursued the character traits of "the great man" only to abandon this futile pursuit after the list became limitless. (Heilbrunn, 1994, 66-7) From a broader perspective, the concept of antecedent conditions is brought out in the sources of conflict and their various contests over resources, values, goals, meaning, etc.

## **VI. AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPLES BEHIND CROSS-OVER FACTORS**

### **A. UNDERSTANDING NEGOTIATOR ORIENTATION THROUGH KNOWLEDGE OF THE CROSS-OVER FACTORS**

Knowledge of the cross-over factors and their mechanisms can help researchers understand negotiator orientation. Through a re-examination of those cross-over factors gleaned from the several studies, we can draw some conclusions concerning Dant and Schul's classes which characterize the cross-over factors, i.e., issue characteristics, relationship characteristics, structural characteristics, and their ability to resolve specific types of conflicts. Using their framework, this section outlines these considerations to demonstrate the insight we might gain into negotiator orientation through a better understanding of cross-over factors.

#### **1. Cross-over Factors Among the Issue Characteristics**

As Dant and Schul (1992) reported, *high stakes* or a *high investment* of resources merits a higher investment of time. They reasoned that since the integrative approach typically requires more time than the distributive approach, high stakes negotiations had a better chance of being integrative. They also reported that negotiators who deal with extremely complex issues will favor problem-solving and persuasion over bargaining and politicking; complexity has the inherent capacity to provide more options and more alternatives. Perhaps these findings suggest that the enormity of high stakes and high complexity arrangements brings about a higher level of commitment. If this conclusion is correct, then we can look for other factors which increase commitment. Once our counterparts increase their commitment—their investment in resources, their time, their energy, their concern—they will tend to justify their efforts to work out some solution. In fact, the more time our counterparts spend talking with us in an effort to make some sort of deal, the more they commit to the process of negotiation, and

the more they have invested in coming to an agreement. Put simply, the more we invest in a negotiation, the more we will justify the relationship. (Aronson, 1984, pp. 113-181) "When a person rationalizes, he is interpreting a situation in a manner that will place him in the most favorable light." (Nierenberg, 1986, p. 38) Accordingly, negotiators will justify their expenditure of time and resources; they will come to believe that the deal and the relationship are worth the greater investment; they will then do those things which support that relationship; those things which they will do tend to promote an integrative approach.

Johnston (1982) suggested that negotiations would be more collaborative when negotiators enjoy *mutual comprehension* and when they *make similar appraisals of their communications*. This common understanding or "meeting of the minds" presupposes the lack of some conceptual conflict, i.e., cognitive, substantive, affective conflicts, conflicts of interests or values. Johnston further suggests that negotiations would be more collaborative when the organization demanded higher quality of products or more informed discussion about the job. When the organizational goals require greater interaction, involvement, and input from its members the organization is likely to de-emphasize conflict and promote organizational alignment. To this end the members of the organization will tend to work out a common understanding of common problems through more persuasive methods, i.e., problem-solving and persuasion. Those cross-over factors dealing with issue characteristics help us rationalize (or justify) or help us develop a common understanding to resolve conceptual conflicts.

## **2. Cross-over Factors Among the Relationship Characteristics**

As Dant and Schul (1992) reported, a *high functionality of conflict*, or mutual ability to determine one another's future, helps reduce the concern for placing controls on our counterpart. They also reported that *a high degree of relationalism* and *high frequency of contact* typically engender substantial

interaction and responsiveness between parties. This substantial interaction facilitates communication and information exchange. Lastly, we should expect that a *high degree of trust* helps build the type of relationship characterized by information exchange and openness to influence; moreover, it is self-perpetuating; trust begets trust. The Zand (1971) model suggests that these relationship factors will exhibit spiral reinforcement. Again, the reduced concern for controlling others, increased information exchange, and increased trust—which we should expect from these factors—support the Zand model. Knowledge of these cross-over factors suggests a specific approach to applying the principles of spiral reinforcement. Moreover, knowledge of these cross-over factors tells us something about the type of relationship required to stabilize either orientation.

For interest-based negotiations, we must proceed independent of trust; however, our trustworthiness is important in building the relationship, facilitating information exchange, and reducing controls. Information exchange is the vital process in the effort to uncover underlying interests and needs; it is the very process through which we expose the rationale behind our perspectives and discover the true sources of conflict. Our being open to persuasion and open to influence is another important aspect of interest-based negotiation. Our openness to persuasion allows us to appreciate our counterpart's reasoning, values, and emotions; it allows us to compare our own reasoning, etc., and flesh out the underlying source of conflict. Our openness to persuasion ultimately allows us to hear the specific reasons, values, and emotions, etc., which present a source of conflict. Once we have heard our counterpart's perspective, we can choose to modify our own attitudes in light of this new perspective, or we can work to influence our counterpart, *or we can come to some third solution which dovetails both perspectives and ultimately addresses both concerns.*

Together, our trustworthiness and *high incidents of reframing* further promote an approach where negotiators can underscore their common interests and de-emphasize their differences. An atmosphere of trust, a climate which supports our capacity to accept influence, is critical to fostering the parties' efforts to reframe issues. Cynically viewed, reframing is nothing more than "spin-doctoring," hedging, quibbling, or deception, thus the trusting atmosphere plays a principle role in the parties' resolving to appreciate and engage in reframing. The cross-over factors we find among the relationship characteristics underscore the common concern for building trust. These factors are well suited to deal with the nature of nonrealistic conflicts, i.e., the displaced, misattributed, and retributive conflict. Since these factors are able to facilitate interest-based negotiations (or at least cooperative negotiations); since they alleviate nonrealistic conflicts, we might conclude that the nature of the interest-based negotiator orientation is one focused on resolving realistic conflict and handling nonrealistic conflicts before they damage the relationship.

### **3. Cross-over Factors Among the Environmental Characteristics**

*High uncertainty* may drive two or more would-be adversaries together for the sake of survival, on the other hand, *high munificence* (generosity), and friendliness during discussions help forge a relationship because negotiators find that dealing with one another is pleasurable. (Dant and Schul, 1992; Johnston, 1982) When negotiators increase the amount of communication among them—particularly when they use more active listening to achieve understanding—they activate the forces of spiral reinforcement. When negotiators come together—when they *organize towards goals*, display a *willingness to implement suggestions*, and *give increased attentiveness to other members* who have come together—who have organized to deal with some problem through negotiation, these negotiators have

created an environment which facilitates communication and supports spiral reinforcement. (Johnston, 1982; Zand, 1971)

Lastly, Johnston (1982, p. 163) suggested that *internal or external motivation to achieve goals* promotes collaboration. Here Johnston implied that goal setting is the substantial element in selecting the interest-based orientation regardless of whether the motivation comes from an internal or external source. As we will consider in the next section, external motivation can be principally compliance based, i.e., focusing on rewards and punishment. These methods of eliciting conformity are fleeting. They fail to tap into needs beyond self-interest. They support a mind-set of pay-off maximization and position-based transactions. However, when an external motivation factor focuses on goal setting, it employs higher methods of eliciting conformity, such as identification or internalization.<sup>1</sup>

The environmental cross-over factors emphasize the elements of trust and cooperation. Where nonrealistic conflicts are at the root of a dispute, these cross-over factors create an environment which helps negotiators build a relationship with one another.

#### **4. Cross-over Factors Among the Structural Characteristics**

*High organizational integration, better coordination of efforts, better division of labor, equitable distribution of work, and increased productivity per unit of time* help improve the negotiator's capacity to deal with issues efficiently. (Johnston, 1982) The improved efficiencies realized from these activities justifies the effort required to support the integrative approach. These factors help resolve or even prevent the problems which typically arise from realistic conflict. For instance, we expect the equitable distribution of work to forestall most disputes involving the burdens placed on a certain person. In negotiations, we would expect the equitable distribution of work to arrest the unraveling of an agreement

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<sup>1</sup> *Compliance, Identification, and Internalization* are the three modes through which we may elicit conformity according to Aronson (1984). The next section addresses conformity in greater length.

nearing its completion—an unraveling which might otherwise occur if one party felt that it was unfairly burdened with the work of bringing about an agreement. Simply put, the factors presented in this section help form integrative agreements which might otherwise be abandoned as too hard to do. Where negotiations might otherwise contain several sources of conflict or an extremely complex issue, these structural factors enable the parties to begin resolving the conflict before it escalates—as the parties establish the structure of their meetings, rules, teams, etc.

### **5. Cross-over Factors Among the Personality Characteristics**

Of the myriad of possible personality characteristics, the literature deals with only a small number of personality traits. Even so, our current understanding of personality provides little insight into the outcomes we can expect to realize when we mix different people in different situations. Personality has a profound yet indeterminate affect on negotiations. Often times, a personality trait requires a certain catalyst in order for it to become a factor in a negotiation. For example, experienced negotiators who are otherwise quick to anger typically learn to exercise self-control. Although, they may rarely become angry during negotiations, the right catalyst may activate their true personality traits and cause these negotiators to make atypical choices out of anger. (Lamm, 1997) These true personality traits, such as *extroversion*, *suspiciousness*, *acrimony*, etc., often require a catalyst to activate them if our counterparts choose not to be themselves. In such cases, true personality traits can work as **latent cross-over factors**; we cannot endow a person with a hot temper, we can only activate that existing endowment. Latent cross-over factors are permanent or relatively permanent character traits which bring about a specific negotiator orientation under certain conditions. These conditions, or catalysts, could also be considered cross-over factors, but we must address the latent factor in order to adequately identify qualities which have bearing on negotiator orientation.

On the other hand, emotions or sentiments are less permanent than personality traits. Emotions or sentiments can be changed and thus a cross-over initiated. Hermann and Kogan, and others list some traits which are less permanent than the type outlined above. For instance, *anxiety* is situational. It can be mitigated or induced. *Cognitive complexity* and *similarity with our counterpart* are also situational. High cognitive complexity is **situational, but relatively fixed**. The degree of cognitive complexity an individual holds is situational in the sense that it may vary according to subject matter; it is fixed in the sense that it remains fairly constant over a long period of time. For example, the late President Nixon displayed an extraordinary degree of cognitive complexity in matters of geopolitical strategy, thus he proved to be a masterful negotiator in matters of diplomacy. His cognitive complexity was much lower in the area of mechanical devices--as we might conclude from his ill-fated tape-recording fiasco.<sup>2</sup> (Haldeman, 1994, p. 680) Accordingly, we would not expect him to demonstrate the same degree of prowess as a negotiator for weapon systems.<sup>3</sup> Cognitive complexity is an example of a personality trait which is predominantly situation-dependent, yet a part of an individual's permanent psychological endowment.

Anxiety is an example of a **transitive personality trait** or emotion that is fairly easy to activate. While individuals are endowed with the propensity to exhibit a certain degree of anxiety, conditions of the negotiation can easily fuel the levels of anxiety that parties hold. As we have seen in the three examples, personality traits can be categorized as latent cross-over factors, situational-fixed, or transitive. Latent cross-over factors are permanent or relatively permanent

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<sup>2</sup> The fiasco in question is the famous 18 minute gap of tape recording which alerted many to the extensive cover up of the Watergate scandal. Haldeman in his book, *The Ends of Power*, attributed the clumsy recording gap to Nixon, who was known to be not mechanically inclined.

<sup>3</sup> Of course Nixon did serve in World War II as a Naval supply officer. He may have proven to be a capable weapon system negotiator, but the point to be made here is that as a statesman--due largely to his gift for geopolitical strategy and his cognitive complexity--his negotiating skills were *nonpareil*.

character traits which must be activated by certain conditions or catalysts. Situational-fixed cross-over factors are propensities, and not necessary character traits. These are less susceptible to the dynamics of a negotiation; they are relatively fixed for a given scenario. Transitive cross-over factors are emotional states which are relatively easy to activate.

#### **6. Summary of the Analysis of Cross-over Factors**

Dant and Schul's framework bring about greater insight into the negotiator orientation through a better understanding of cross-over factors. Our grasp of issue characteristics suggests that negotiators will justify their expenditure of time and resources, ultimately leading them to do those things which promote an integrative approach. The cross-over factors we find among the relationship characteristics underscore the common concern for building trust and suggest that greater interaction and involvement from parties tends to de-emphasize conflict and promote organizational alignment. Environmental factors which facilitate communication support a positive spiral reinforcement. Also when the environment provides external motivation factors which focus on goal setting, it employs higher methods of eliciting conformity. Where the sources of conflict involve high complexity, structural factors enable the parties to begin resolving the conflict before it escalates.

#### **B. CROSS-OVER FACTORS OR CROSS-OVER PRINCIPLES?**

The research of Dant and Schul (1992), Johnston (1982), and Hermann and Kogan (1977) has provided several candidates from which we might identify cross-over factors—actions, or traits capable of causing latent action, which cause negotiators to shift their orientation from position-based to interest-based or vice versa. These studies represent a collection of theories drawn from research on specific factors or variables thought to make negotiations more cooperative or collaborative, or thought to foster the problem-solving and persuasive styles of

conflict management. These studies have taken an essentially reductionist approach to identifying certain variables—isolating them in a controlled experiment and ignoring the complexity of human interaction. To make sense of the many exceptions to the rules, experts were asked to validate or refute the many factors. To make further sense of these several theories—to achieve synthesis—the cross-over factors were examined against the framework of social influence and existing models supporting the notion of a cross-over dynamic.

### **1. Sanctions: the Tit-for-Tat Principle**

Chapter III presented several models and theories which demonstrated the cross-over dynamic. Among those concepts, both the Tit-for-Tat and GRIT theories applied the principle of employing sanctions. In the Tit-for-Tat model, each party has the power to repay the other tit-for-tat, in other words, parties have the power to sanction one another. Since sanctions present one of the simplest means of controlling behavior, Tit-for-Tat and similar theories are easy to comprehend and employ.

Negotiators exercise reward power with their counterparts by validating *their* actions, furnishing resources, or withholding punishments. By validating their counterpart's actions, their objective is to take a leadership role and affirm our counterpart's good behavior. When negotiators are truthful and accepted as trustworthy, they can validate their counterpart and increase the others' appreciation of them. (Aronson, 1984, pp. 286) Accordingly, the other negotiator is more likely to be open to influence, at least on the unimportant issues. (Aronson, 1984, p. 81) Even more important, validation is a more positive way to practice Tit-for-Tat than repaying harm. (Lamm, 1991) Negotiators may employ a range of material rewards to encourage positive behavior or a favorable concession of positions. Negotiators may repay their counterpart's concession with some concession of resource of their own; they may reward positive behavior. Again in

Tit-for-Tat, the sole method for achieving compliance is through the application of sanctions: rewards and punishments.

## **2. Identification**

Although, none of the models apply the principle of identification, its use has strong potential in creating conformity to a specific negotiator orientation. "Conformity can be defined as a change in a person's behavior or opinions as a result of real or imagined pressure from a person or group of people." (Aronson, 1984, p. 17) Conformity, as Aronson outlines it, denotes three types of social influence: compliance, identification, and internalization. Identification is a type of behavior adopted to relate to a person or group of people. For example, mothers of past generations might have cajoled young boys to eat their spinach because "Popeye eats his spinach—and you want to grow up to be strong like Popeye." Identification as a mode of influence is not intrinsically satisfying; as Aronson wrote, "...he (any individual) adopts a particular behavior because it puts him in a satisfying relationship to the person or persons with whom he is identifying." (Aronson, 1984, p. 32) Like compliance, identification relies on extrinsic rewards or punishments, but with identification, the reinforcement schedule becomes less significant. To use another example, suppose a young boy, John, is asked to clean his room, and suppose John developed an attachment to—began to identify with—a sloppy television character, for instance, Theo Huxtable of the *Cosby* show. If his identification with Theo becomes more important than the nickel his parents give him for cleaning his room, then he is less likely to comply when they ask him to clean up his room. If the nickel (and perhaps the praise they give him when they reward him) is more important than his identification with Theo, then we would expect John to clean his room despite the negative influence that Theo might have. If John's parents controlled his behavior by rewarding him, and then discontinue the rewards, his behavior (cleaning his

room) will likely extinguish. In fact, because John continues to respond to the reward of the nickel, his parents may never learn of Theo's negative influence. Therein lies the problem. Long after we discontinue a reinforcement schedule, latent influences often take effect. Behavior influenced by identification is relatively permanent compared to that caused by compliance.

### **3. Internalization**

Internalization occurs when people adopt an attitude, belief, or behavior because they believe they are right. Aronson presented several findings in a chapter on self-justification to support his conclusion that the desire to be right represents an extremely powerful motive. "The motivation to internalize a particular belief is the desire to be right. Thus the reward for the belief is intrinsic. If the person who provides the influence is perceived to be trustworthy and of good judgment, we accept the belief he or she advocates and we integrate it into our system of values." (Aronson, 1984, p. 33) Aronson stated that the critical component of the internalization process is competence; however, the passage cited also suggests that trustworthiness has a substantial affect on internalization. Covey also prescribed trustworthiness for the principle-centered leader. "Trustworthiness is more than integrity; it also connotes competence. In other words, you may be an honest doctor, but before I trust you, I want to know that you're competent as well." (Covey, 1992, p. 171)

### **4. Social Influence: The Principles Behind the Cyclical Model of Transactional Exchange**

When negotiators have to justify the expenditure of their resources, they tend to select an integrative approach. When they share a common concern for building trust, they tend to de-emphasize conflict, promote a positive spiral reinforcement, and negotiate side-by side. The environment provides internal and external motivation factors which focus on goal setting. Where the sources of conflict involve high complexity, structural factors enable the parties to begin

resolving the conflict before it escalates. Dant and Schul's framework brings about greater insight into the negotiator orientation through a better understanding of cross-over factors. Our knowledge of psychology has roots in both classical behaviorism and humanism. The substantial body of knowledge emerging from studies in behaviorism supports our understanding of compliance as a mode of social influence. The scientific methodology has also yielded findings which help us understand some of the phenomena of our human social systems, e.g., compliance, identification, and internalization.

## **VII. CONCLUSION**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

The purpose of this chapter is to present the conclusions, the recommendations, the research questions, and suggestions for further study.

### **B. CONCLUSIONS**

#### **1. Validity of the Researcher's Proposed Model**

Based on the presence of similar concepts in several other theories and models, we can conclude that the researcher's model has content validity. This content validity was established in Chapters II and III. A review of the literature uncovered several other models or theories which supported the idea of a cross-over dynamic, but the proposed model serves uniquely as a process-focus model, since it highlights the differences between the focus of a position-based negotiation and the focus of an interest-based negotiation. The researcher's model in Figure 1 demonstrates an existing pathway by which a set of cross over factors causes negotiations to vacillate between distributive and integrative processes—negotiators move from their concern for their own respective positions to their concern for the underlying interests involved, or vice-versa. From the model, we can also conclude that negotiation can be seen as a cyclical process of transactional exchange among parties seeking to fulfill their sets of needs through social influence.

#### **2. The Cross-over Dynamic**

The survey of the literature and the presentation of the several related models support the notion that the cross-over dynamic does exist. Once applied to a continuum, March and Simon's taxonomy of the organizational reaction to conflict characterized the shift in negotiator orientations in a manner consistent with other research findings. Specifically, negotiator orientation moves or vacillates along a continuum.

### **3. The List of Cross-over Factors**

The cross-over factors previously listed are only a sample of the conditions that will cause negotiators to vacillate between the two extremes: position-based and interest-based negotiation. These factors may come in and out of popularity, but the principles behind them demonstrate the mechanisms through which the cross-over dynamic works. Recent history from the study of leadership has shown this to be the case when scholars pursued the character traits of the "great man" only to abandon this futile pursuit after the list became limitless. (Heilbrunn, 1994, 66-7) From a broader perspective, the concept of antecedent conditions is brought out in the sources of conflict and their various contests over resources, values, goals, meaning, etc.

## **C. RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **1. Concepts and Theories for Training and Education**

Educators should present the models, concepts, and theories concerned with interest-based negotiations. First, a basic understanding of interest-based negotiation should become a part of the education of students in Systems Management, particularly the Acquisition and Contract Management (815) curriculum. In an era of sharpening budgetary constraints, dynamic technical complexity, and changing business relationships, military officers should be educated to take a leadership role as problem-solvers in civilian-military teaming arrangements, while upholding the public trust that they will minimize the burden on the tax payer.

### **2. Reading List**

Educators, students, and professional negotiators should familiarize themselves with the principles of interest-based negotiation and psychology. According to the Harvard Negotiation Project, psychology is the least understood of the disciplines which support the study of negotiation—this important discipline is the next frontier in that study. To this end the researcher has developed the reading list in the appendix.

### **3. Distribution**

After this work is published, the distribution list should be amended to provide ample copies to students of the Pricing and Negotiation course, MN 3304, and the National Security Affairs (NSA) Department of the Naval Postgraduate School. The recommended distribution to support this requirement is as follows:

- ♦ five to Dr. D. V. Lamm (815)
- ♦ one to NSA or the Marine Corps Representative (NSA Department Instructor)

### **D. ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

This section presents a summary of the answers to the research questions. Subsection 1 presents the primary research question. Subsections 2 through 6 present the subsidiary research questions.

#### **1. Primary Question: To What Extent Do Cross-Over Factors Between Distributive and Integrative Negotiation Processes Exist and How Might Such Factors Affect Negotiator Orientation?**

Research supports the notion that cross-over factors exist between the distributive and integrative negotiation processes. Dant and Schul's study report several research findings which showed that many of the cross-over factors named in this work impelled organizations to employ specific conflict management styles. Those factors which fostered problem-solving and persuasion were included as cross-over factors since problem-solving and persuasion are essentially integrative approaches.

These cross-over factors affect negotiator orientation and behavior by changing the issues, relationships, the structure, the environment, or the emotional climate of the negotiation. While some cross-over factors deliver an immediate impact on negotiator orientation, other demonstrate a latent effect. Negotiators often enter into a negotiation with a strategic intention which differs from their natural inclination. In these instances, certain cross-over factors can unsettle even experienced negotiators--undermine their strategy--causing them to react in a

manner more typical of their own human nature. When that reactive human nature is dominated by some previously undisclosed personality trait, we can view that trait as a latent cross-over factor. Some other condition, either planned or accidental, prominent or benign, works as a catalyst to activate the latent cross-over factor.

## **2. What are Distributive and Integrative Negotiations?**

Integrative or interest-based negotiation is a distinct subset of cooperative negotiation. It involves a high degree of informational exchange aimed at mutual problem-solving. It is characterized by interactions which facilitate relatively higher levels of trust than would be found in other negotiations. Cooperative negotiations entail a broad set of negotiations where parties accommodate their counterparts' efforts to explore their own needs. In cooperative negotiations, the parties are more open to persuasion. In distributive or position-based negotiations, parties typically focus on some plan of action or objective to fulfill their sets of needs. The effort to secure some agreement focuses on these objectives, or positions, and not on the parties' overall concerns or interests. In position-based negotiations, parties can work either cooperatively or competitively. Position-based negotiators typically view differences as fixed; they see the agreement as the conclusion of some zero sum contest and focus on obtaining some desired portion of gains.

## **3. Do Negotiations Vacillate Between the Distributive and Integrative Cycles of the Model?**

Chapter III presented several existing models to support the contention that negotiations indeed vacillate between the distributive and integrative cycles of the researcher's model. Organizational Reaction to Conflict showed that organizations tend to have their own unique climates. These climates cultivate certain conflict management behaviors in the organization's members. Tit-for-Tat represents a simple "eye for an eye" or quid pro quo strategy. It does little to promote the actual cross-over to interest-based or cooperative negotiation.

Graduated and Reciprocated Initiative in Tension-reduction (GRIT), like Tit-for-Tat, is a responsive strategy. GRIT elicits the cross-over by communicating cooperative intent and using a modified tit-for-tat. The Triangle Model is a perception model, which proposes that position-based negotiators see their counterparts as capable of position-based negotiating *only* while interest-based negotiators tend to see their counterparts as being capable of either position- or interest-based negotiation. The triangle model provides cross-over insight; through it we realize that we can foster the cross-over to interest-based negotiation by explaining how it works. The Spiral Reinforcement Model demonstrates how restricting information, resisting influence, and seeking to impose controls can generate a downward spiral of mistrust. On the other hand, sharing information and building trust combine synergistically, *and* they are fundamentally the most important activities of a negotiation, particularly in interest-based negotiations. The Crude Law of Social Relations has three tenets which outline the dynamics between the climate of the organization and the orientation of the individual negotiators. The first tenet supports March and Simon's Organizational Reaction to Conflict; the second, Zand's Spiral Reinforcement Model. The third tenet supports the underlying premises of the researcher's cross-over model, that: a firmly developed atmosphere will be readily changed should one party act deliberately and clearly in a manner contradictory to the existing atmosphere. Five Conflict Handling Modes presented a dual concern model which showed that the cardinal personality factors in negotiation--assertiveness and cooperation--were not mutually exclusive polar opposites. These seven models and concepts detail various mechanisms by which negotiators cross-over from a position-based to an interest-based orientation and vice versa.

#### 4. Does a Set of Common Cross-Over Factors Exist?

Several factors have been identified which promote interest-based negotiation. These factors are held to be generic or common cross-over factors--appropriate regardless of the profession of the negotiator. Factors from the Dant

and Schul study were presented from research findings which compared the tendency to use problem-solving and persuasion with the tendency to use bargaining and politicking. Dant and Schul also provide a useful framework in which to categorize the cross-over factors:

- ◆ Issue Characteristics
- ◆ Relationship Characteristics
- ◆ Environmental Characteristics
- ◆ Structural Characteristics
- ◆ Personality Characteristics

While not supported by research findings, the factors taken from the Johnston article offer solid behaviors or action items that negotiators can implement to promote the cross-over in orientations. The Hermann and Kogan study reports the research findings concerning eight personality characteristics which engender the shift in negotiator orientation. Key factors from other studies were also presented as cross-over factors. The cross-over factors from the various studies can have action in the present or latent action. The repressed endowments of personality often serve as latent cross-over factors.

##### **5. What are the Antecedents to these Cross-Over Factors?**

The sources of conflict establish a framework for examining the antecedent conditions to conflict; it is conflict which brings about the need for negotiation. The specific sources of conflict lay out the battle ground of the dispute--the battle ground of values, goals, tensions, hostilities, means, ends, understanding, perception, or emotion. If the integrative approach can be seen as a process for removing conflict, then the cross-over factor is some activity or condition which removes or alleviates conflict. Accordingly, the antecedent to the position-based to interest-based cross-over factor is the emergence of conflict. Conversely, if the distributive approach can be seen as a process for maximizing payoff according to a zero-sum perspective, then its cross-over factor is some condition which fixes differences. The antecedent to the interest-based to position-based cross-over is

the emergence of some incentive impelling the parties to take control in the process of determining their portion of a gain. These are the antecedents to the cross over factors in a general sense. From a broader perspective, the concept of antecedent conditions is brought out in the sources of conflict and their various contests over resources, values, goals, meaning, etc.

**6. How Might Knowledge of these Factors Assist in Understanding Negotiator Orientation?**

The cross-over factors from specific research findings and Dant and Schul's framework generate a greater understanding of negotiator orientation. The set of factors characterized by issues show that once negotiators have justified the expenditure of their resources, they tend to select an integrative approach. Relationship-building cross-over factors show that when negotiators share a common concern for building trust, they tend to de-emphasize conflict, promote a positive spiral reinforcement, and negotiate side-by-side. When the environment provides internal and external motivation factors which focus of goal setting, we can expect the distributive to integrative cross-over. Where the sources of conflict involve high complexity, structural factors enable the parties to begin resolving the conflict before it escalates. A number of cross-over factors appear to gain their effectiveness by managing or contributing to: (1) the commitment of resources, (2) trust, (3) goal-setting, and (4) the complexity of issues.

**E. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH**

**1. Further Study of Johnston's Factors**

Johnston (1982, p. 164) presented ten factors which he suggested would shift negotiations from competitive to collaborative; however, he does not offer data or evidence from research findings to support his contentions. Yet compared with Dant and Schul, or Hermann and Kogan, Johnston's factors stand out as descriptive—and prescriptive—concrete conditions which establish an organizational climate supportive of interest-based negotiation. Accordingly,

future research should be conducted to determine if any correlation between Johnston's factors and the integrative cycle exists.

**2. Further Study of Anxiety, Cognitive Complexity, and Self-Esteem from Hermann and Kogan's Factors**

Hermann and Kogan's study presented eight personality factors which the researcher framed as potential cross-over factors. Specifically, the authors reviewed the literature and designed an experiment to determine which groups competitiveness, cooperativeness, or exploitativeness were more likely to exhibit particular factors. Although the authors reported high anxiety, low cognitive complexity, and low self-esteem, as consistent with cooperativeness, the researcher considered these findings to be suspect; the authors' literature review was inconclusive, and experts also disagreed. (Lamm, 1997; Lewicki, 1997) Accordingly, further research should be conducted using the prisoner's dilemma model to determine the repeatability of Dant and Schul's findings.

**3. Further Study in Computer Modeling in Interest-based Negotiation**

Further research should be conducted in computer modeling. Specifically, software-assisted simulation models may help determine the true relationships among the set of potential cross-over factors. Contractors such as Phred Development, Inc., have expanded their business support software services to include current efforts to support interest-based negotiation.

## APPENDIX. ANNOTATED READING LIST

Aronson, Elliot *The Social Animal*. 4th ed., New York: W. H. Freeman & Co., 1984. Aronson's classic text is an excellent social psychology primer for leaders, managers, negotiators, and educators. The chapters on compliance, persuasion, self-justification, and attraction offer profound insight into human behavior. The work is easy to read, entertaining, and replete with vivid examples to explain concepts.

Cohen, Herb, *You Can Negotiate Anything*. New York: Bantam Books, 1980. Cohen's non-scholarly work is a "pop-psychology, best-seller type" book. Part II on the three crucial variables: power, time, and information is worth reading. His telephone negotiations and memos of agreement is excellent and fun reading.

Covey, Stephen R., *Principle-Centered Leadership*. 1st Fireside ed., New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992. Covey presents sound leadership advice and insight in this extremely popular personal development work. His discussion of the win-win orientation and synergy are particularly useful to the student of interest-based negotiations. He rehashes the "seven habits" and presents several papers with topics ranging from "Completed Staff Work" to "Making Champions of your Children."

Craver, Charles B., *Effective Legal Negotiation and Settlement*, 2nd ed., Charlottesville, VA: Michie, 1995. Craver's work is written for students of law, but is easily understood by most readers. A proponent of phase theory, he provides ample coverage of both distributive and integrative approaches.

Dant, Rajiv P. and Patrick L. Schul, "Conflict Resolution Processes in Contractual Channels of Distribution," *Journal of Marketing*, Vol. 56, January 1992, pp. 38-54. Dant and Schul offer a framework for examining several situations in which negotiators exhibit either (1) problem-solving and persuading or (2) bargaining and politicking. The two pairs of conflict management styles (also referred to as

organizational reaction to conflict) provide an excellent setting in which to identify organizational climates and their affects on negotiations.

Dixit, Avinash K., and Barry J. Nalebuff, *Thinking Strategically: the Competitive Edge in Business, Politics, and Everyday Life*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1991. Dixit and Nalebuff present extremely challenging and profound concepts in game theory and strategy. Extremely easy to read and enjoyable, this text should be the reader's first selection from the reading list.

Fisher, Roger and Scott Brown, *Getting Together: Building Relationships As We Negotiate*. New York: Penguin Books, 1989. Among Fisher's popular works, this is his second. The key concept from this work is the strategy of being unconditionally constructive. (p. 38) The rest of the text simply expands on the six unconditionally constructive behaviors.

Fisher, Roger, William Ury and Bruce Patton, *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving in*. 2d ed. New York: Penguin Books, 1991. Fisher's *Getting to Yes* (GTY) is his first and finest primer on negotiation. GTY is the cornerstone text in interest-based negotiation.

French, John R. P., Jr., and Bertram Raven, "The Bases of Social Power," *Studies in Social Power*. Dorwin Cartwright, (ed.), Ann Arbor, Mich: Institute for Social Research, 1959. French and Raven's classic theory on social power is widely accepted and the topic of many works in negotiation. These are important social psychological concepts for leaders, managers, negotiators, and educators.

Herzberg, Frederick, "One more time: How do you motivate employees?" *Harvard Business Review: Business Classics: Fifteen Key Concepts for Managerial Success*. 1991., pp. 13-22. Reprinted from HBR January-February 1968, No. 68108. Herzberg's classic "two-factor theory" is discussed in this superb work. Herzberg's model offers a pragmatic alternative to Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs theory.

Keirsey, David, and Marilyn Bates, *Please Understand Me: Character & Temperament Types*. Del Mar, Calif: Prometheus Nemesis Book Company, 1984.

Keirsey and Bates present their abbreviated version of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator in this "pop-psychology type" text. The authors address the personality temperaments, based on the theory of personality types of Carl Jung. Although it begins to read like a horoscope, the authors' conjecture is based on the highly esteemed work of Isabel Myers and Katherine Briggs.

Lamm, David V. *Negotiation: Cases for Government and Industry*, Woodcrafters: Gaithersburg, MD, 1993. Unique in its presentation of real case material for students of contracting, Lamm's text is designed to facilitate mock negotiations and case studies. Most of the cases require a companion text which contains confidential information for the participants on both sides of the mock negotiations.

Lewicki, Roy J. and Joseph A. Litterer, *Negotiation: Readings, Exercises and Cases*, Irwin: Homewood, Illinois, 1985. Lewicki provides a unique mix of theory, case study, exercises, and opinion pieces. The text can be read in part or in its entirety; it is capable of facilitating a course of study in negotiations.

Nierenberg, Gerald I., *The Art of Negotiating*, New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1986. Nierenberg's war stories make good reading and offer vivid examples for discussion on the subject of negotiation. In an attempt to be scholarly, Nierenberg looses most readers in a protracted scheme using as a framework Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs with a variety of applications--working for/against your/other's needs--all at various organizational levels from individual to international. No need to read past page 128.

Raiffa, Howard, *The Art and Science of Negotiation*. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1982. Extremely difficult to read, this classic presents technical concepts and provides some insight into the complex studies explored at the Harvard Negotiation Project.

Sebenius, James, "Negotiation Analysis: A Characterization and Review" *Management Science*, Vol. 38, No. 1, January 1992, pp. 18-38. Sebenius' work is a moderately technical product of the Harvard Negotiation Project. This paper

does an excellent job of presenting pareto analysis to show the potential losses of payoffs in competitive arrangements.

Senge, Peter, *The Fifth Discipline*. New York: Doubleday/Currency, 1990. Senge's work contains several key concepts useful in negotiation. Every leader and negotiator should understand the distinction Senge makes between discussion and dialogue. Also every reader will benefit from understanding the principle concepts outlined: personal mastery, shared visions, mental models, systems thinking, and team learning.

Thomas, Kenneth W., "Conflict and Conflict Management" *The Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology*. draft copy to appear in second edition. editor, Marvin D. Dunnette and Lenetta M. Hough, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1992. Thomas presents an overview of conflict resolution that every serious student of negotiation or conflict resolution must read. This work outlines his widely accepted dual concern model, conflict episodes, pay-offs, conflict escalation and aggression, etc. Thomas' work is easy to read and makes effective use of illustrations to explain several abstract constructs.

Thompson, Leigh, *The Mind and Heart of the Negotiator*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998. A suitable text for graduate education, Thompson's work provides an unique examination of the psychology of negotiation. The grand theme of this extensive text is "A Tripod of Skills," namely, decision making, social perception, and negotiator rationality.

Ury, William, *Getting Past No: Negotiating Your Way From Confrontation to Cooperation*. rev. ed. New York: Simon & Schuster, Fireside Edition, 1986. Ury's text follows GTY which he co-authored. Getting Past No is the second in a series of four popular texts inspired by the Harvard Negotiation project.

Zand, Dale E., "Trust and Managerial Problem Solving" *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 17, 1972, pp. 229-239. Zand's model of spiral reinforcement should be a classic and among the first works the student of interest-based negotiation should read.

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